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L Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the United States has adopted and refined
rigorous legislation to curb the payment of bribes by U.S. companies.
Through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19771 as amended in 1988
(FCPA),2 payment of bribes abroad by U.S. businesspersons has become
a crime subject to incarceration, fines, or both Under the FCPA's influ-
ence, corruption in world markets has become an important legal issue for
U.S. companies doing business abroad.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1982)).
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1994)).
3. For a discussion of the penalty provisions of both the original 1977 legislation and
the legislation as amended in 1988, see infra text accompanying notes 86 and 112-14.
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The U.S. approach to bribery under the FCPA is severe by global
standards. The United States is the only nation that has crimmalized the
extraterritorial payment of bribes by domestic companies.4 A district court
decision suggests that the reach of the FCPA may go even further - that
under appropriate conditions, foreign nationals subject to U.S. jurisdiction
may be convicted under the provisions of the FCPA for paying bribes
outside U.S. borders.' The impressive scope and enforcement potential of
the FCPA are enhanced by the recognition of private actions under appro-
priate conditions.' Furthermore, if a pattern of violations exists, the
FCPA's rigor can be intensified by the assessment of civil penalties, includ-
mg treble damages, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO).7
Historically, authorities have been lax m enforcing the FCPA.8
Although the government has instituted aggressive surveillance policies
during the past few years,9 illegal payment of bribes remains among the
4. See Jennifer Daehler, Note, Professional Versus Moral Responsibility in the Devel-
oping World, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 240 (1995).
5. See Dooley v United Tech. Corp., 803 F Supp. 428, 438-40 (D.D.C. 1992).
6. For a discussion of private actions under the FCPA generally, see Lawrence W
Newman & Michael Burrows, Private Claims Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1992, at 3.
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). For a discussion of the requirements of standing
to pursue a civil RICO claim m regard to FCPA violations, see generally Reddy v. Litton
Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir.
1987); and Williams v. Hall, 683 F Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky 1988). For a discussion of the
boundaries of applying civil RICO to FCPA violations, see generally W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectomcs Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990); and Clayco Petroleum v. Occi-
dental Petroleum, 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). For criticism of the evocation
of civil RICO in FCPA cases, see generally Raymond J. Dowd, Note, Civil RICO Misread:
The Judicial Repeal of the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 946 (1990-91).
8. Although several dozen cases have been investigated under the FCPA, no chief
executive has been convicted for a violation. U.S. Firms Handicapped, INTELLIGENCE
NEWS L., Mar. 21, 1996, at 284, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
Furthermore, no new FCPA prosecutions have been filed during the past year. Arthur F
Mathews et al., The 1995 and Early 1996 SEC Enforcement Review: Part Il7, INSIGHTS,
Aug. 1996, at 15, 22.
9. See James K. Lehman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, S.C. LAW., Mar./Apr.
1996, at 38, 39 (observing that FCPA has recently attained prominence due to increased
Department of Justice scrutiny of white-collar crime).
Experts expect even more vigorous enforcement in the future. See Gabriel Escobar,
IBM Is m Trouble m Argentina,. Indictment Says Fraud Won Major Contract, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File (noting opinion of
experts that number of FCPA enforcement cases will grow rapidly under conditions of
increasing global competition).
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most prominently publicized white-collar crunes, ° both domestically and
internationally 11 Corruption is a tenacious reality in many global markets,
where foreign officials continue to solicit bribes routinely from U.S. com-
pames and their representatives. 12 The proliferation of illegal payments has
been exacerbated by recent increases in the size of typical kickbacks. 3
The remainder of this Introduction provides background information
concerning the current worldwide challenge of corruption. Subpart A out-
lines a wide range of recent global efforts to eliminate bribery Subpart B
provides examples of corruption or alleged corruption in the 1990s, demon-
strating the pervasiveness and persistence of the problem. Subpart C out-
lines the challenges Congress faces as a result of the observations made m
subparts A and B. Subpart C also outlines the body of the Article, which
assesses and ultimately rejects the wisdom of the FCPA approach.
10. Ordinarily, we expect that crnmmalization will have a deterrent effect. However,
when a single nation prohibits behaviors that are permitted worldwide, violation of the law
may be rampant as a result of civil disobedience based on perceptions that the law is neither
justifiable nor fair. This result may be especially pronounced when the behavior being
curbed crosses mtematio ial borders, thereby encouraging cross-national equity comparisons.
Because the FCPA applies by definition to international contexts and reflects a contrarian
philosophy that inposes disadvantage to those who comply, ongoing periodic violations are
not surprising.
11. Although both the FCPA and much press coverage focus on bribery abroad,
bribery has not been expunged within the United States. Domestic payment of kickbacks
remains a particularly thorny problem. For example, a former purchasing director for
Philip Morris recently admitted tax evasion m regard to a $75,000 payment he received
from a Philip Morris display materials supplier. Amy Neeno, Ex-Philip Morris Purchasing
Director Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion, WEsr's LEGAL Nws 5538, June 12, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 313605.
12. The most recent such allegations concern reports that Filipino officials requested
and were refused bribes from Apple, IBM, and AT&T in exchange for a computer and
telecommunication technologies contract. Ramos Orders Probe into Government Computer
Deal, JAPAN ECON. NEwswPE, May 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws
File.
13. See Kenneth A. Cutshaw, Russian Roulette, FED. LAW., Jan. 1996, at 30, 34
(citing American Chamber of Commerce report stating that "what used to be a reasonable
and almost codified system of payments has now lost all sense of reality and proportion");
Heads of State "For Sale" for $5 Million, UN Says, REUTERS LTD., Apr. 27, 1995, avail-
able m LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File (quoting background paper on official corrup-
tion given by Secretariat of United Nations conference on crime stating: "In many coun-
tries five percent would now be considered a laughably low rate of commission.");
Cristina Rouvalis, The Ecuadorean Connection: Even Though Business Conditions Are
Better, a Distributor for a Pittsburgh Company Finds It's No "Piece of Cake" Keeping
Things on the Up-and-Up in South America, Prrr. PoST-GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1995, at El
(citing observation of one U.S. businessperson that bribes have increased in recent years
from 3-4% to 10-15%).
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A. Recent Efforts to Eliminate Bribery
Although it is the only country to crumnalize the extraterritorial pay-
ment of bribes, 4 the United States is working to encourage other nations
to follow suit. In the spring of 1995, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky stated that the United States would move aggressively to pro-
mote adoption of FCPA-type laws in other major trading nations as part of
an effort to increase transparency m frequently furtive government procure-
ment processes. 15
By early 1996, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) addressed a tax policy that is widely believed to encourage
or support international bribery - the deductibility of bribes paid to foreign
officials as business expenses m a number of industrialized nations. 6 The
OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted a resolution that member
countries reject or abolish such deductions. 7 Because the resolution repre-
sents a commitment only from the twenty-six member countries of the
OECD, the organization is seeking ways to encourage nonmembers to
institute similar reforms.18
Likewise, U.S. and Latin American officials are working on the devel-
opment of a hemispheric agreement to curb the payment of bribes to foreign
14. See Daehler, supra note 4, at 240. Despite sluggish progress m persuading the
world to adopt an FCPA-style stance on bribery, experts frequently observe that tolerance
for bribery appears to be waning worldwide. See Barbara Ettore, Why Overseas Bribery
Won't Last, MGMT. REV., June 1994, at 20, available in LEXIS News Library, Manrev File
(recognizing that other nations are beginning to realize economic harms associated with
corporate bribery).
15. U.S. to Seek Foreign Acceptance of Anti-Corruption Laws, Practices, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 714, 714 (Apr. 26, 1995).
16. See Robert S. Leiken, An End to Corruption, WASH. PosT, Apr. 16, 1996, at A15
("If a German bribes a German he gets thrown m jail; if he bribes a foreign official he gets
a tax deduction."). According to Jean-Claude Paye, Secretary General of the OECD, tax
deductibility of bribes "increas[es] transaction costs and distort[s] competitive conditions."
Gary G. Yerkey, OECD Nations Agree to Eliminate Tax Deductibility for Foreign Bribes,
13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 628 (Apr. 17, 1996) (quoting Jean-Claude Paye).
17 OECD Looking to Encourage Non-Member Countries to Adopt Anti-Bribery Laws,
DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 17, 1996, at D7 This OECD stance does not have the force of law,
but does represent the first time the organization has called upon members to eliminate the
deductions voluntarily. For a discussion of the resolution, see Bribery and Corruption:
Goodbye to All That?, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1996 (Power Asia), available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allnws File; and Bribes Can Cost the U.S. an Edge, Bus. WK., Apr. 15, 1996,
at 30; OECD Urges Bribes Action, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1996 "(Power Asia), at 5.
18. See OECD Looking to Encourage Non-Member Countries to Adopt Anti-Bribery
Laws, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Apr. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
Bnaibf File.
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officials.19 In March of 1996, the Orgamzation of American States (OAS),
consisting of tlurty-four Western Hemisphere members, drafted a multilateral
agreement to prevent bribery and corruption in international business. 20
Under the agreement, known as the "Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption" (Convention), 2 signatories make a commitment to adopt laws
that are the "rough equivalent" of the FCPA.? The Convention also sup-
ports extradition, asset seizure, and evidence gathering; creates common ethi-
cal principles among signatories; and seeks regularity and transparency m
financial disclosure and record-keeping practices.23 The Convention was a
central issue at an OAS meeting held in Panama City in June of 1996.2
Later that month, the United States became the twenty-second member of the
OAS to subscribe to the agreement.' While the ramifications of the OAS
Convention remain uncertain, a State Department official observed that "for
the first time in a regional setting, other countries have signed up in some
measure" to the principles of the FCPA. The degree to which signatories
follow through on their commitments by adopting FCPA-style prohibitions
of extraterritorial bribes remains to be seen.
Simultaneously, other organizations committed to free trade are looking
for ways to combat bribery In 1995, a United Nations committee drafted
a code of conduct that would prohibit public officials from accepting gifts
and favors.' In 1996, the U.S. delegation proposed a United Nations declar-
ation calling for international transparency in accounting standards, accurate
record-keeping practices, and international cooperation m the investigation
of bribery 1
19. See U.S. Discusses Possible Agreement with Latin America to Deter Bribery, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 276, 276-77 (Feb. 21, 1996).
20. See Gilles Trequesser, Inter-American Convention Signed Against Corruption,
REUTERS EUR. Bus. REP., Mar. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
21. Id.
22. See Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Council of the Americas
Conference, State Dep't. Briefing, FED. NEwS SERVICE, May 6, 1996, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File.
23. United States Signs OAS Convention on Preventing Bribery, Corruption, BNA INT'L
TRADE DAILY, June 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaitd File.
24. State Department Regular Briefing, FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 4, 1996, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter State Department Briefing].
25. See United States Signs OAS Convention on Preventing Bribery, Corruption, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1014, 1014 (June 19, 1996).
26. See State Department Briefing, supra note 24 (quoting State Department representa-
tive Davies).
27 Samia Nakhoul, U.N. Wants Anti-Graft Code for Officials, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, May 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
28. Thalif Deen, U.S. Seeks U.N. Declaration Against Bribery, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) is likewise engaged m efforts to
fight bribery m foreign procurement settings and has plans to begin negotia-
tions regarding "transparency, openness, and due process m government
procurement practices of all WTO Members."29 U.S. Trade Representative
Barshefsky intended to encourage similar efforts m Asia at the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit, convened in Manila m late 199 6 .30
A group called Transparency International is the first major private
organization created for the sole purpose of eliminating global corruption.
Established m Berlin m 1993, it has branched into dozens of countries
throughout the world, 31 in locations such as England, the United States,
Turkey, and Nepal. 32 Transparency International works to effect reforms
through a process of "quiet diplomacy, ' 33 espousing increased visibility of
government procurement procedures as a vital step in the eradication of
bribery 3 Much of the organization's work in its first few years of operation
has focused on investigating and exposing international corruption.35 Efforts
have included lobbying for reform m both developed and developing coun-
tries,36 encouraging companies to establish "islands of integrity" by partici-
pating m antibribery pacts, 37 and compiling a survey ranking fifty countries
on the basis of a corruption index.38
Some transnational treaties address the problem of bribery As one
observer notes, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) "pre-
scribes unbiased and transparent admnistrative procedures. [I]n the case
July 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
29. USTR Announces Two Decisions: Title VII and Special 301, WEST'S LEGAL NEws
3385, May 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 359843.
30. Just Say No to Bribery, Bus. WK., July 29, 1996, at 43.
31. Anti-Corruption Organization - Hunganan Section, MTI ECONEWS, Mar. 1, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
32. See Stevie Cameron, Drearming of a World Without Corruption, MACLEAN'S, Apr.
8, 1996, at 36.
33. Raymond Bonner, The Worldly Business of Bribes: Qiuet Battle Is Joined, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 8, 1996, at A3.
34. Advocates of transparency reason that it encourages the accurate flow of information,
wich is necessary to the efficient functioning of free markets. Andrew Hilton, Without Trans-
parency, Corruption Flourishes - But So Can Prosperity, WORLDPAPER, Mar. 1996, at 1.
35. Uganda: Nongovernmental Organization Launched to Investigate Corruption, BBC
SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File.
36. Baie Netzer, Stopping Bribes at Source, INT'L HERALD TRm., Nov. 11, 1995, at 17
37 Id.
38. See Gary Borg, Survey Rates Corrupt Nations, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1996, at 8. For
a descnption of the Transparency International corruption index, see Barbara Crossette, New
Watchdog Group Ranks Nations in "Corruption Index," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, § 1, at 6.
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of government procurement of goods or services, these procedures are de-
signed to ascertain that governmental contracts, grants, concessions or fran-
chises are adjudicated not on the basis of family or friendly connec-
tions or bribery, but on a publicly advertised, lowest-bidder basis."39
Most recently, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Inter-
national Law and Practice issued recommendations to the House of Dele-
gates supporting efforts m the international community to control corruption
in the conduct of international business (ABA Recommendations).' The
ABA Recommendations recognize the value of global cooperation m devel-
oping measures to deter corrupt practices.4" The ABA Recommendations
observe that past efforts towards such cooperation have been "soft."42
Without outlining a specific approach, the ABA Recommendations empha-
sized the importance of a global commitment to "the development and
enforcement of proper national and international laws."43
B. The Intransigence of Corruption Despite
U.S. and Global Efforts
Despite past and present efforts to expunge bribery, corruption in over-
seas markets remains a daunting problem.' The sampling of recent prose-
cutions discussed in this subpart, although illustrative, represents only a
fraction of worldwide mcidents in recent years, the majority of which are
likely to go undetected and therefore unreported.
In 1989, advertising firm Young & Rubicam was indicted for violation
of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA during contract negotiations with
the Tourist Board of Jamaica.45 The firm settled, entering a plea of guilty
and agreeing to pay fines totaling $500,000."
39. See Borts Kozolchyk, NAFTA m the Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 138 (1996).
40. See generally Jay M. Vogelson, Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of International
Business: Section Recommendations and Reports, American Bar Association Section of Inter-
national Law and Practice Reports to the House of Delegates, 30 INT'L LAW. 193 (1996)
(making recommendations about how to address corrupt practices).
41. Id. at 198.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally Stewart Toy et al., From Corner Office to Corner Cell, Bus. WK.
INT'L ED., July 22, 1996, at 20.
45. See United States v Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F Supp. 334, 337 (D. Conn.
1990). For a discussion of the indictment, see Joanne Lipman, Indictment Charges Young
& Rubicam, 2 Top Aides Bribed Jamaican Officials, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1989, at B5.
46. See Joanne Lipman, Young & Rubicam Pleads Guilty to Settle Jamaica Case,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1990, at B4.
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Several years later, charges were brought against Vitusa m connection
with its sale of powdered milk to Horizontes Domucanos, a company m
the Dominican Republic.47 The company pleaded guilty to allegations that
it offered, through an agent, so-called "service fees," with the knowledge
that some of the fees would go to foreign officials to gain their influence
m obtaining and retaining business.' Settlement negotiations resulted m the
unposition of a two-year probation period against the company's president
and personal and corporate fines totaling $20,000.49
In early 1995, Lockheed Corporation admitted paying $1,000,000 to
a government official to facilitate the sale of aircraft in Egypt.5" Fines
assessed totaled over twenty million dollars, double the profits realized by
Lockheed under the contract associated with the prohibited payments. 5'
Shortly thereafter, a federal grand jury investigated suspicions of improper
payments by Lockheed in the sale of fighter jets and antisubmarine planes
to Korea. 52
In 1996, companies such as IBM and Boeing were under investigation
for possible violations related to alleged illegal payments in Argentina and
the Bahamas, respectively.53 Activity that is prohibited by the FCPA or
that evokes exanunation of FCPA compliance is prominent m today's
national and world media. The proliferation of publicity surrounding the
behavior of reputable companies suggests that, despite the statutory reforms
adopted in 1988, 4 FCPA compliance remains a thorny issue for American
businesses. With the FCPA approaching its twentieth anniversary and with
global antibribery efforts thriving, why are so many reputable businesses
still getting into trouble?
47 United States v. Vitusa Corp., 3 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.)
699.155, 699.155-.175 (1994).
48. Id. at 699.164.
49. Id. Although the settlement assessed fines of $5000 m personal penalties and
$20,000 m corporate penalties, the personal penalties were designated as applicable towards
the payment of the corporate penalties. Id.
50. Andy Pasztor, Lockheed Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Violate Anti-Bribery Regu-
lations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at B6.
51. $24.8 Million Penalty Paid by Lockheed, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 28, 1995, at 35.
52. Andy Pasztor & Jeff Cole, Lockheed Martin Faces 3 Federal Probes into Possible
Payments for Foreign Sales, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at A6.
53. See Gabriel Escobar, Ex-Officials of IBM Argentina Are Indicted in Payoff Probe,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al, Jonathan Friedland, Did IBM Unit Bribe Officials in
Argentina to Land a Contract?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1995, at Al, Sharon Walsh, For
IBM, Nightmare in Argentina, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Mar. 8, 1996, at 11.
54. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1994)).
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Among the plausible explanations are two diametrically opposed
theories. One theory suggests that the FCPA places unreasonable burdens
on U.S. businesses and is therefore destined to fail.55 In cutthroat global
markets, U.S. companies are pressured to match the moral standards of
competing suppliers. Because the United States is the only country to crim-
malize extraterritorial bribery payments, 6 these moral standards are often
low Because the FCPA creates unrealistic expectations, frequent violations
are inevitable. This line of reasoning suggests that violations may be more
attributable to quixotic law than to evil companies.
An opposing theory contends that FCPA compliance would improve
if global standards became universally stringent.' This theory concedes that
companies presently violate the FCPA because its unilateral stringency
creates a burdensome competitive disadvantage. The question that follows
is whether Congress should level the playing field by seeking uniformly low
ethical standards or uniformly high ethical standards. Proponents of the
FCPA suggest that the United States should lobby for global adoption of
FCPA-style legislation rather than abandon the statute's lofty moral
ground.
58
C. The Policy Challenge for Congress
Each of the two positions discussed in the previous subpart is grounded
in the same basic premise - that FCPA violations are encouraged by unfair
competitive global markets created by unilaterally stringent American rules.
Violations so attributable can be reduced either by revoking the law or by
universalizing it. Tis Article examines in detail the many issues that
Congress should consider in determining which method best addresses the
challenge.
Part II describes the provisions of the FCPA, as originally passed in
1977 and as amended in 1988. The discussion addresses the original
version's perceived shortcomings and the ways in which the 1988 Amend-
ments sought to rectify them.
Part HI contains a detailed catalogue and discussion of arguments put
forth by proponents of the FCPA, who believe that crminalization of
extraterritorial bribery is sound public policy that should be maintained in
55. For a more complete discussion of the ideas outlined briefly m this paragraph, see
infra Part IV.A.
56. See Daehler, supra note 4, at 240.
57 For a more complete discussion of the ideas outlined briefly m this paragraph, see
infra Part llI.B.
58. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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the United States and adopted by other countries. These arguments include
assertions of the importance of averting economic waste by eradicating
corruption; the need to establish a globally consistent high moral ground so
that companies in nations that crnmalize bribery do not suffer a competi-
tive disadvantage; and the relatively low burden to companies under im-
provements attempted via the 1988 Amendments.
Part IV compiles and discusses the arguments made by opponents of
the FCPA, who believe that extraterritorial bribery should not be crn-
mealized. Included are contentions that such legislation imposes a competi-
tive disadvantage on countries that choose to adopt it; that market mecha-
msms can provide more effective, less costly, less severely punitive means
of inhibiting international corruption than the FCPA, and that efforts to
control bribery in other nations constitute moral imperialism.
Part V contains recommendations regarding the advisability of main-
taming the FCPA in the United States and promoting the adoption of
similar legislation m other countries. Weighing the arguments m Parts I
and IV, Part V concludes that although many forms of bribery are harmful,
FCPA-style legislation is not the best means of eliminating corruption. Part
V then provides alternative solutions. It is followed by a brief Conclusion,
summarizing the Article's main points.
II. The U.S. Approach Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
A. The Original Version of the FCPA
The FCPA was passed by Congress m 1977,11 in reaction to a flurry
of scandals during the 1970s6' and an SEC report of questionable payments
made to foreign officials by hundreds of U.S. companies.6' In addition to
provisions that created accounting standards for issuers of securities,62 the
FCPA established what have become known as antibribery provisions. The
antibribery provisions prohibited the corrupt offering, paying, pronusing to
59. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1982)).
60. See GEORGE C. GREANiAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17-31 (1982) (describing origins of FCPA).
61. SEC. &EXCH. COMM'N, 94TH CONG., QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976). Through a survey m which respondents
were promised immunity from prosecution in exchange for their provision of information,
over four hundred companies, including 117 Fortune 500 compames, admitted to the
practice of paying bribes. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 781(m) (1982). One purpose of these provisions was to discourage
payment of bribes by requiring companies to keep accurate records in which all forms of
payments would be disclosed.
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pay, or authorizing of payments or gifts of value 3 by issuers of U.S. secu-
rities,' domestic concerns,' and their officers, directors, employees, and
agents,' to foreign officials, foreign political parties, officials thereof, can-
didates for foreign political office, and intermediaries, in order to obtain,
retain, or direct business.67
Congress intended the FCPA to be expansive, prohibiting not only the
successful payment of bribes, but also attempts not fully consummated or
effective in achieving their desired ends.6" The FCPA prohibited indirect
payments - payments through intermediaries or third parties - under lan-
guage forbidding offers, payments, and related acts to "any person, while
knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,
to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or
to any candidate for foreign political office,"69 for proscribed purposes.7"
63. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a).
64. Although "issuers" were not defined by the statute, they were noted to include
those who register a class of securities pursuant to Section 12 or those who are required to
file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. § 78dd-l(a).
65. Id. § 78dd-2. The statute defines a domestic concern as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place
of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State
of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United
States.
Id. § 78dd-2(d)(1).
66. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a).
67 Id. Both the original and revised versions of the FCPA prohibit only payments
ultimately directed to government officials and not payments ultimately directed to private
parties. The distinction between public officials and private parties may be obscured m
transitional economies that are in the process of pnvatization. Jeffrey P Bialos & Gregory
Husisian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Corruption in Russia and Other
Transitional Economies, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1995, at 747-48
(Michael Gruson ed., 1995).
68. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108;
H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 7-8 (1977).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), -2(a)(3) (1982).
70. The proscribed purposes are:
[I]nfluencmg any act or decision of such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, including a decision to fail to
perform his or its official functions [or] mducmg such foreign official, political
party, party official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision
of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer [or domestic
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The phrase "any person" extended the FCPA's coverage to include pay-
ments not directly given to prohibited classes of recipients, but indirectly
passed to such recipients through the use of an agent.
The FCPA's third-party payment prohibition covered two types of
agent utilization: making payments through one's own agents7' and direct-
Ing payments to the agents of prohibited recipients.' The "reason to know"
scienter standard applied not only to the corrupt purpose behind the pay-
ment, but also to the identity of the end receiver.7' Critics characterized the
"reason to know" standard as vague74 and harsh,75 imposing criminal liabil-
ity on busmesspersons unaware that foreign agents sometimes divert por-
tions of their fees to the payment of bribes.76 Proponents of the third-party
payment provision, with its powerful "reason to know" standard, insisted
that in its absence, payers could and would maintain an intentional igno-
rance of the passing of funds from agents to foreign officials for corrupt
purposes.71
The 1977 antibribery provisions in the FCPA contained a business
purpose clause, forbidding payments and gifts made or offered for the pur-
pose of assisting the issuer or domestic concern to obtain, retain, or direct
concern] m obtaining or retaining business-for or with, or directing business to,
any person.
Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3)(A) to -1(a)(3)(B), -2(a)(3)(A) to -2(a)(3)(B).
71. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a).
72. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3).
73. Id.
74. See Richard A. Hibey, The Practical Necessity for Amendment of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: S. 708 - the Current Legislative Initiative, 10 HoFsTRA L. REv
1121, 1131 (1982); John M. Fedders, The "Reason to Know" Standard - A Troublesome
Ambiguity in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, MIDDLE E. ExEcUTIVE REP., July 1981,
at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
75. The peculiar harshness of the original FCPA has been grounded m the notion that
its "reason to know" standard is stricter than the scenter standard applied by domestic U.S.
bribery law. Ruth Aurora Witherspoon, Multinational Corporations - Governmental
Regulation of Business Ethics Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977" An Analysis,
87 DICK. L. REv 531, 562 (1983).
76. For example, British managers who pay local agents fees to represent them m
negotiating business transactions abroad may be unaware that portions of the fees are used
to purchase gifts for influential individuals. See Tim Hardy, Suitable Codes of Conduct for
English Businesses Abroad, LAWYER, June 13, 1995, at 6.
77 See Julia Christina Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1988. Clarification or Evisceration?, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441, 459-60 (1989)
(citing 134 CONG. REC. 8528 (daily ed. June 24, 1988) (containing arguments of Senator
Proxmire in favor of maintaining third-party payment provisions of 1977 Act in 1988
Amendments)).
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business.7" The business purpose clause could reasonably be interpreted to
restrict the statute's prohibitions exclusively to those payments made to
procure or maintain business, for oneself or another. Under tis construc-
tion, payments rendered to create favorable business relationshups with
foreign officials could arguably be exempt from the FCPA's coverage. 9
The FCPA, as originally passed m 1977, created an exception permit-
ting payments to those foreign officials whose duties were essentially "min-
istenal" or "clerical."I Tius special accommodation reflected a philosophy
that such payments comprise a kind of fee that becomes a part of the pay
received by lower-level workers whose official salaries may be made-
quate.1' Moreover, because nmnistenal and clerical duties presumably entail
little or no application of discretion in the conferral of scarce favors, the
rendering of payments in exchange for the execution of such duties was
considered relatively innocuous.1
The 1977 version of the FCPA evoked federal jurisdiction through a
requirement that a purported violation use a means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or the mails.Y Like other statutes that establish federal
jurisdiction in this manner, the FCPA's interstate commerce requirement
has been easily met and has rarely inhibited applicability I Civil enforce-
ment of the FCPA's antibribery provisions against reporting companies was
and still is handled by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
whereas civil enforcement against domestic concerns, as well as all criminal
prosecutions against any parties, are relegated to the Department of Justice
(DOJ). a Although violators of the 1977 version of the FCPA were subject
to fines of up to $1,000,000 for corporations, $10,000 for persons, and
imprisonment for up to five years,"' prosecutions were rare.
8 7
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1) to -(a)(3), -2(a)(i) to -2(a)(3) (1982).
79. See Bliss & Spak, supra note 77, at 456.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
81. For a discussion of the characterization of some bribes as tips, consultancy fees,
commissions, etc., see On the Take, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988, at 21-24.
82. Veronica A. Deberardine, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Creating an Excep-
tion to the Act of State Doctrine, 34 AM. U. L. RP-v 203, 224-25 (1984).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1982).
84. Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 439-40 (1987).
85. Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001, 59,003 (1980); Illegal Payments Provisions of Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Discussed at Law Journal Seminar, 452 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
A-3 (May 10, 1978).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b)(1) to -2(b)(3) (1982).
87 During the period following enactment of the FCPA through the 1988 Amendments,
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B. The 1988 Amendments to the FCPA
During the 1980s, critics began calling for modification of the FCPA.88
In 1988, the FCPA was revised under the aegis of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act (OTCA). 9 According to Senator Heinz, one of the
principal sponsors of the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, the changes
embodied an effort to eliminate some exportation obstacles facing U.S.
firms m the era of a burdensome trade deficit.' Of particular concern were
charges that the FCPA as originally enacted was so vague as to be indeci-
pherable.91 Critics contended that U.S. businesses shunned legitimate
transactions, the legality of which was difficult to assess under the statute's
ambiguous language.'
Like their predecessor, the 1988 Amendments cover issuers of securi-
ties, domestic concerns, and the officers, directors, employees, agents, or
stockholders of either issuers or domestic concerns.' It is unlawful for
these individuals and entities "to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money,
or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of
only twenty-three cases were prosecuted by both the DOJ and the SEC. Sherry R. Sontag,
Bribery a Close Call: Is New Legislation Really Needed?, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1988, at 1, 16.
For DOJ prosecutions, most of which resulted in guilty pleas, see generally United States
v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984); Complaint for Permanent Injunction, United States
v. Carver, 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.) 645 (Dec. 31, 1982); Informa-
tion, United States v. Kenny Int'l Corp., 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.)
649 (Dec. 31, 1982); Information, United States v. International Harvester Co., 2 Foreign
Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.) 696.27 (Jan 31, 1984); and Information, United States
v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.) 696.38 (Jan.
31, 1984).
For SEC actions, see generally Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Certain Ancillary
Relief, SEC v. Sam P Wallace Co., 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.) 683
(Dec. 31, 1982); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, SEC v.
Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.) 637 (Dec. 31,
1982); and Complaint, SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L.,
Inc.) 616 (Dec. 31, 1982).
88. Irwin Arieff, U.S. Business Groups Back Move to Ease Overseas Bribery Law,
REuTERs N. EUR. SERVICE, Apr. 20, 1986, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
89. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-
5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1107-1574 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1994)).
90. 134 CONG. REc. S2589-90 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988) (statement of Senator John
Heinz).
91. See Barbara Bradley, Trade Bill Could Dilute Anti-Bribe Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Mar. 23, 1988, at 3.
92. See id.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
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value," to proscribed classes of recipients for prohibited purposes. I Classes
of recipients covered by the 1988 Amendments continue to include foreign
officials, foreign political parties, officials of foreign political parties, candi-
dates for foreign political office, and their intermediaries. 9  Prohibited
purposes can be classified under the general headings of "influence" and
"inducement." Payments cannot be made to influence decisions, induce the
use of influence, or induce violation of lawful duties.'
The 1988 Amendments altered the scienter requirement of the 1977
version of the FCPA, which prohibited payments that the payer knew or had
reason to know were for the purpose of influencing officials or mducmg
officials to use their influence for some business gain - obtaining business,
receiving business, or having business directed to another person.' 7 The
1988 Amendments require actual knowledge that some or all moneys paid
will go to designated recipients for proscribed purposes. 98 This new scienter
standard includes a "firm belief" that the unlawful activity is "substantially
certain to occur."' 9 The statute further clarifies: "When knowledge of the
existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowl-
edge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence
of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circum-
stance does not exist. ""
The purpose of the actual knowledge standard is to maintain the essence
of the 1977 version of the FCPA's proscription of third-party payments,
without holding payers liable when they are unaware that the ultimate pur-
pose of the payment is illegal influence of a foreign official. Under the
"firm belief" and "awareness" components of the knowledge standard,
managers who maintain a willful ignorance can still be held accountable for
having information they seek to avoid. 101 How much real progress the 1988
Amendments have made in improving the scienter requirement of the original
FCPA is discussed in some detail in Parts IV and V
94. Id.
95. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1) to -1(a)(3), -2(a)(1) to -2(a)(3).
96. Id. §§ 78dd-1, -2.
97 The gain can be m the form of the officer's directing business to the payer of the
bribe, as well as the receipt of preferential treatment not associated with any particular
transaction. H.R. CONF REP. No. 100-576, at 918 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1951.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1994).
99. Id. §§ 78dd-l(f)(2)(A)(ii), -2(h)(3)(A)(ii).
100. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).
101. Michael D. Nilsson, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV 803,
809, 813 n.53 (1996).
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As in the original FCPA, the intent required under the 1988 Amend-
ments is encompassed m the term "corruptly " Specifically, the amended
FCPA prohibits "use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce corruptly" in furtherance of prohibited acts. 1" Unfortu-
nately, the amended FCPA offers no definition of "corruptly "103 Legislative
history and reports from both 1977 and 1988 suggest that the concept of
corruption was used m the statute to signify a bad intent. The legislative
history of the 1977 version indicates that the word "corruptly" "connotes an
evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient." 104
A 1988 House report reaffirms that the "corruptly made" requirement refers
to intent to influence the actions of foreign officials."° A 1977 Senate report
likewise notes that "corruptly" signifies payments "intended to induce the
recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business
to the payer or Ins client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable
regulation." 1 6 Functioning to explicate an intent requirement that is largely
embodied m the statute's scienter provision, the "corruptly made" require-
ment appears to create few, if any, hurdles m the prosecution of alleged
FCPA violators. 11
The 1988 Amendments did not expressly clarify ambiguities regarding
the business purpose test of the 1977 version of the FCPA - i.e., whether
solicitation to procure, retain, or direct business is necessary to trigger liabil-
ity, or whether liability also extends to payments made to create favorable
business relationships with foreign officials or bodies. 108 Congress rejected
a House version of the OTCA that would have expressly prohibited payments
not only for the purpose of directly receiving business, but also for the more
indirect purposes of procuring "legislative, judicial, regulatory, or other
action in seeking more favorable treatment by a foreign government." 1o The
legislative history indicates, however, that the bribery prohibition language
of the 1988 Amendments covers payments "related to the execution or per-
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a).
103. See id. §§ 78dd-l(f), -2(h) (definition section appurtenant to antibribery portions
of FCPA).
104. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
105. H.R. CoNF REP. No. 100-576, at 328 (1988).
106. S. REP No. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
107 See United States v Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
defendant's arguments that gifts of airline tickets to official's relatives were not corruptly
tendered).
108. For a discussion of the business purpose test, see supra text accompanying notes
78-79.
109. H.R. 3, 100th Cong. § 701(a) (1988).
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formance of contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as a
payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax
treatment. ""10
Violation of the 1988 Amendments includes not only actual payment of
bribes, but also acts "in furtherance" of bribery "I Although the maximum
imprisonment for violation remains at five years under the 1988 Amend-
ments, the maximum fines were raised to $2,000,000 for domestic concerns
and $100,000 for individuals. " In addition, both domestic concerns and
individuals can be assessed maximum civil penalties of $10,000. 1 The
FCPA maintains the separateness of its entity and individual punishments by
prohibiting domestic concerns from paying, either directly or indirectly, fines
that have been assessed against individuals. "4 The 1988 Amendments also
contain a section that authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil actions
seeking miunctive relief when domestic concerns or their officers, directors,
employees, agents or stockholders are making or are about to make payments
prohibited under the FCPA." 5
Because of difficulties under the 1977 version of the FCPA m identify-
mg officials who could be given lawful payments because their duties were
essentially "minsterial" or "clerical,"" 6 the 1988 Amendments reformulated
the exclusion for grease payments. Instead of focusing on the duties of the
recipient of the payment in the manner of the original FCPA, the 1988
Amendments exempted payments for "routine government actions" by
foreign officials. 117 The 1988 Amendments illustrated routine government
actions by providing specific examples, including the obtaining of permits,
licenses, and official documents necessary to do business; the processing of
papers, police protection, mail delivery, and inspections; the provision of
basic utilities and like services; and other similar actions.'
The 1988 Amendments created two new affirmative defenses to liability
for the payment of bribes - reasonable, bona fide expenditures and legality
in the host country The reasonable, bona fide expenditure defense applies
to payment for such services as travel and lodging m relation to such legiti-
110. Bliss & Spak, supra note 77, at 456-57 (quoting H.R. CONF REP. No. 100-576,
at 918 (1988) (accompanying H.R. 3)).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
112. Id. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(g).
113. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), -2(g)(2)(C).
114. Id. § 78dd-2(g)(3).
115. Id. § 78dd-2(d).
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1994).
118. Id.
246
BRIBERY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET
mate contractual processes as promoting, demonstrating, and explaining
products or services."19 The legality defense exonerates the payer of a bribe
to a foreign official if the written laws of the country in wlch it is paid
permit the bribe." ° The legality defense applies only when a payment is
made expressly permissible by a written law 121 In other words, a country's
decision not to proscribe payments prohibited under the FCPA is insufficient
to trigger the legality defense. " This requirement of written authorization
renders the legality defense virtually unusable. 1
Although neither the original FCPA nor the 1988 Amendments specifi-
cally addressed the issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held m 1991
that the FCPA does not authorize prosecutions of foreign officials who
receive bribes either for direct violation of the FCPA or for engaging in
conspiracy to violate the FCPA.124 This finding logically follows from the
wording of the FCPA that prohibits offers, payments, promises to pay, and
authorization of payment, but not receipt of bribes. 125 Moreover, even if the
intent of the FCPA were to criminalize the taking of bribes by foreign
officials, grounds for exercising jurisdiction in such cases would frequently
be lacking.
In Kirkpatnck v Environmental Tectonics Corp., the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a private civil RICO action predicated on FCPA
violations.'2 Under Kirkpatnck, damages can be awarded to a firm that
competes unsuccessfully against the payer of a bribe."Z The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has restricted the use of private FCPA antibribery actions
in cases when the plaintiff's purported mjuries were not in the form of direct
119. Id. § 78dd-2(c)(2).
120. Id. § 78dd-2(c)(1).
121. Id.
122. H.R. CoNF REP. No. 100-576, at 556 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1589; see Agnmeszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 126 nn.27-28 (1996); Nilsson, supra note 101, at
813 n.63.
123. Written laws typically identify unlawful rather than lawful acts. The infinite
variety of human activities are presumed lawful unless otherwise so stipulated. It is
therefore unlikely that the acceptability of certain payments m particular nations will be
denoted by the express codification required to trigger the legality defense. For further
discussion, see Gregory K. Smith et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 AM. CRIM. L.
REV 541, 557 (1991).
124. United States v Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per cunam).
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
126. Kirkpatrick v Environmental Tectomcs Corp., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d Cir.
1988), aft'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
127 Id.
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loss of a contract or business opportunity to the payer of a bribe. In Lamb
v Philip Mons, Inc., the plaintiffs were tobacco growers in Kentucky who
sued Philip Moms for alleged payments of bribes overseas that purportedly
facilitated the purchase of Venezuelan tobacco, thereby reducing the
defendant's purchase of domestic tobacco, including tobacco grown by the
plaintiffs." The court ruled that the FCPA does not create actionable
private rights in this context. 9
The 1988 Amendments establish an executive charge to foster global
adherence to the principles and policies of the FCPA. They request the
President to seek the cooperation of OECD members in adopting FCPA
standards and to report to Congress on progress in this effort.13 The 1988
Amendments likewise require the U.S. Attorney General to deternune the
extent to which compliance would be enhanced and the business community
assisted by "further clarification" of the FCPA's provisions."' Specifically,
the mandate requires the Attorney General to consult high-level agencies
and officials3  and solicit more general public opimon via notice and
comment procedures to assess the value of guidelines (i) describing specific
kinds of conduct covered by the statute, and (ii) providing "general precau-
tionary procedures" that might be used to conform with the DOJ's FCPA
enforcement policies.' In compliance, the Attorney General solicited
public comments in 19 8911 and determined the following year that the
publication of FCPA guidelines was unnecessary 135 As of early 1996, the
Attorney General's office has not reversed this decision. 36
128. Lamb v Philip Morms, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1025 (6th Cir. 1990).
129. Id. at 1028.
130. The OTCA contained an International Agreement Negotiations Report that
described "the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation of an
international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with
respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section."
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102
Stat. 1107, 1424-25.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(d) (1994).
132. The agencies and officials enumerated included the SEC, the Secretary of Com-
merce, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Treasury
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5003(a), 102 Stat. at 1417
133. Id.
134. Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Fed. Reg.
40,918, 40,918 (1989).
135. Anti-Bribery Provisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,694, 28,694 (1990).
136. Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD
Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument,
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IX. Arguments for Crminalizing the Payment of Bribes Abroad
Those who favor the FCPA's prohibition of extraterritorial bribery
payments, as well as the promotion of such legislation in other countries,
rely on three basic arguments. The first two arguments address the dys-
functional and unethical nature of bribery, and the third argument explains
why the FCPA is a reasonable mechanism for fighting bribery Discussed
in detail m separate subparts, these arguments include assertions that
(a) bribery must be fought aggressively to avert economic waste, (b) the
United States must encourage adoption of FCPA-style legislation abroad to
eliminate competitive disadvantage to U.S. firms in international markets,
and (c) vagueness and chilling effect charges lodged against the FCPA are
spurious.
A. Bribery Must Be Fought Aggressively to Avert Economic Waste
The payment of bribes is wasteful and inefficient137 and has been found
to be associated with low economic growth as measured by gross domestic
product.138 Bribery pollutes the purity of transactions m a free marketplace,
in which buyers and sellers ideally compete for business on the basis of
value optimzation. Without bribes, buyers purchase from the best bidder
in terms of relevant issues of transactional value such as price, service,
and quality 139 Bribery subverts the underlying transaction by diverting
decisionmaker attention to extraneous considerations."' ° When a seller wins
a contract by paying a bribe, the buyer is replacing consideration of price,
service, and quality with an interest m transactionally irrelevant side pay-
ments. This phenomenon harms rejected potential sellers who might have
won a contract in the absence of bribery, as well as a public that relies on
government officials to optimize value in purchasing decisions. Moreover,
14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 210 (1996).
137 See Robert F Dodds, Jr., Offsets in Chinese Government Procurement: The
Partially Open Door, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1119, 1121 (1995) (observing that waste
is ameliorated by competition through open, transparent procurement system characterized
by accountability).
138. Bribonomics, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 86.
139. Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983).
140. One commentator has described bribery as exacerbating the uneven playing fields
associated with trade barriers by moving the goalposts. Gregory L. Miles, Crime, Corrup-
tion and Multinational Business, INT'L Bus., July 1995, at 34, 36. Under these conditions,
technological advantage and quality are marginalized by awarding business to the payer of
the biggest bribe. Id.
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it harms the economy by engendering a decline in our confidence m global
markets. 1
41
Because a decisionmaker who receives a bribe is not typically the
ultimate beneficiary of the product or service being purchased, bribery is
an agency issue. 42 When a government's best interests are supplanted by
an agent's or an official's desires to maxnmize her own payoffs, quality of
purchasing decisions is likely to be impaired.4 Both officers of private
firms and officials of governments who cannot be perfectly monitored may
sacrifice the best interests of their shareholders and constituencies, respec-
tively, in the interest of their own profit.i 44
Even forms of bribery often considered relatively harmless can impair
the quality of decisions. For example, bribes requested by public officials
for the performance of routine functions may be considered mnocuous' 4
under the theory that payments supplement insufficient salaries in nations
that operate under severe financial constraints. 14 Yet compulsory tipping
for public services suggests that basic entitlements, such as police protec-
tion, are being deied to a disenfranchised poor. 47 In this sense, bribes
that elicit special consideration or service at a windfall price may be indis-
tinguishable from those that elicit basic services at a low price that goes
141. See U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Remarks on Bribery and Corrup-
tion m International Trade, Address Before ECAT (Mar. 6, 1996) (observing that Americans
are harmed by loss of confidence in global trading system that is occasioned by bribery in
many parts of world) (transcript on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. Agency issues concern costs incurred when agents act out of self-interest rather
than exclusively m the interest of their principals. Agency theory addresses the costs to
principals of monitoring agents to ensure against opportunistic, self-serving behaviors. See
Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders'
Franchise Right, 44 STAN. L. REV 129, 132 (1991). Although agency theory ordinarily
focuses on agency costs related to corporate governance, analogous costs exist m regard to
national governance and the need to use officials as government agents.
For a detailed discussion of agency theory and agency costs, see generally Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meekling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
143. See Karen Pennar et al., The Destructive Costs of Greasing Palms, BUS. WK.,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 133, 138 (describing construction in Italy of highway overpasses that serve
no apparent function).
144. See David F Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap: Inducement to
Breach of Contract in the Music Industry, 66 TUL. L. REV 771, 798 (1992) ("The greater
the capacity to monitor, the less the risk of opportunistic behavior.").
145. This is certainly the case under the 1988 Amendments, which permit payments for
"routine government actions." See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
146. On the Take, ECONOMIST, Nov 19, 1988, at 21, 24.
147,. Id.
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toward the reasonable compensation of public officials. In either instance,
agency costs distort how officials decide to allocate the resources or public
goods they are charged to distribute.
The agency costs of bribery are harmful not only because they subvert
market transactions. In addition, because many bribes are paid secretly,
their cost is not reflected in the financial statements of bribe-paying compa-
mes.'11 As bribes sometimes reflect as much as thirty percent of the cost
of a contract,149 the magnitude of discrepancy between book entries and
actual payments can be substantial. The omission of bribes from financial
statements interferes with a number of fundamental rights of investors,
including the right to know whether corporate books have been doctored,
whether the corporation has violated laws and paid bribes, and whether
corporate officers have disbursed money without recording the use of
funds. 1' Ironically, the ill effects of omissions of payments from company
financial statements could be rectified in two very different ways - either
by eradicating bribery so that there are no illegal payments to hide or
by legalizing bribery and requiring companies to report the payments
they make.' Accordingly, accounting inaccuracies cited in defense of the
FCPA can be furnished as readily as reasons to abandon the FCPA.
Less easily dismissed are claims that bribery deprives governments of
tax revenues, as corrupt officials permit underreporting of taxes in ex-
change for corrupt payments. 52 The result of such practices is odious on
two distinct levels. First, the inmediate effect of illicitly purchased tax
leniency is to deplete national treasuries charged with the provision of
public services. Second, the relative burdens to individual taxpayers are
unfairly apportioned when payers of bribes are furtively exonerated from
their statutory responsibilities. 53
148. Longobardi, supra note 84, at 434-35.
149. See Paul Coombes, Australia: Greasing Palms Still Used to Ensure Contracts
Handed Out, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws
File.
150. Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
235, 235-36 (1982).
151. Indeed, if bribery is an unavoidable fact of global business that cannot realistically
be expunged, accounting accuracy is arguably fostered by practices in some countries that
permit the payment of bribes to be deducted from taxes as a business expense.
152. Pennar et al., supra note 143, at 133.
153. Tis problem is a distinctly local one. Nations concerned about both protecting
their tax bases and preserving justice m the allocation of tax burdens can and should pass
and enforce laws prohibiting the bribery of or the taking of bribes by tax officials.
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While these problems affect businesses and governments of all nations,
they can be especially damaging in developing countries. .1 Warped political
processes that dram resources have a pronounced effect m places where
scarcity magnifies the harm of dissipating or misdirecting funds. 155 Bribery
payments that convince public officials to invest m marginal rather than
necessary projects or to award contracts on the basis of kickbacks rather than
the overall quality of a bid's value waste assets in developing countries that
can ill afford to have them squandered. 1
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Inflated contract prices, discouragement of investment, and substantial
escalation of the debt of poor countries have all been attributed to the prolif-
eration of bribery 157 Corruption likewise erodes the public's confidence in
the leaders and institutions of developing nations, 158 potentially undermining
governmental stability 159 Moreover, corruption has been credited with
perpetuating authoritarian regimes by giving leaders financial support that
bears no relationship to the quality of their performance. "
The pernicious effects of bribery are likewise severe in a second class
of susceptible economic environments - former Communist economies that
are becoming market driven.' 61  Transitional processes of privatization
154. See Sebastian Rotella, 1BM Scandal Is Equal Parts Spectator Sport and Lesson,
L.A. TMEs, Aug. 11, 1996, at D1 (citing belief of Transparency International that corrup-
tion exacerbates inequality of developing and developed nations).
155. See Cameron, supra note 32, at 36 (referring to comments of Peter Eigen, founder
of Transparency International).
156. Andrei Schleifer & Robert W Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. EcON. 599, 616
(1993); Michael Holman, New Group Targets the Roots of Corruption, FIN. TIMEs, May 5,
1993, at 4.
157 Gail R. Chaddock, More Trade Brings Graft to Light - and to Trial, CHRIsTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 1996 (Int'l Global Report), at 1.
158. See Hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on Drug Trafficking and Interna-
tional Organized Crime, FED. NEws SERVICE, July 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File (testimony of Robert Leiken, President of New Moments m America,
that bribery has pronounced negative effect on developing nations, and specifically that
"[c]orruption destroys the people's trust in their government, breeds mutual distress amongst
citizens, subverts the rule of law and undermines the work ethic").
159. Catherine Yannaca-Small, Battling International Bribery, OECD OBSERVER,
Feb./Mar. 1995, at 16; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 656 (1984) (suggesting
causal relationship between Honduran bribery scandal in 1975 and military coup d'6tat
leading to removal of President Oswaldo Lopez); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1583 (1990) (suggesting that disclosure of bribes paid by
American companies may have been related to collapse of several governments).
160. Christopher Lmgle, Australia: Why Corruption Really Is Wrong, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., July 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
161. See Klich, supra note 122, at 121 ("A negative side effect of the confusion and
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inherently entail what one commentator describes as "shifting assets out of
governments' hands" and "seeing into whose hands they fall."1
62
Because power in such contexts is initially concentrated in the hands of
government officials, determining how state-owned assets will be transferred
to private ownership is fraught with the potential for corruption. 163 Favorit-
ism toward the payers of bribes can have two potentially devastating effects
on transitional economies. First, as in newly developing economies, kick-
backs impair the efficient operations of markets by undermining free transac-
tional exchanges based solely on the quality of what each transactor openly
brings to the table.1" Second, the influence of corruption can exacerbate
gross inequities in the prosperity of the people under newly capitalized
systems. Free markets may be viewed with justifiable disdain if transition
yields a majority of discontented poor. i6 Such dynamics may help explain
why recent experiments in capitalism have proved disappointing in countries
like Russia,16 where allegations of substantial government corruption
abound. 1
67
dislocation caused by the move to market based economies is the rise of corruption m local
business practices."); Melame Manion, Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise
Licensing, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 167 (1996) ("In China, as elsewhere, the transition
from socialist bureaucratic planning to a more decentralized and partially marketized
economy has been accompanied by an explosion of economic crime and corruption."); Karl
M. Meessen, Essay, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: Fighting
Corruption Across the Border, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) (noting that m
regard to shift from central planning to free markets, "[tlimes of transition are times of
corruption").
162. World: Stealing the Family Silver, EUROMONEY, Feb. 27, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
163. See Benjamin B. Klubes & Roberto Iraola, Complying with the FCPA in an Era
of Globalized Trade: A Pnmer for U.S. Businesses, E. ASIAN ExEcUTVE REP., Feb. 1996,
at 9 (noting that in countries with state-owned or state-dominated businesses, trade opportu-
nities require involvement, approval, and oversight of government, creating substantial risks
of solicitation of bribes that are illegal under FCPA).
164. See supra text accompanying note 156.
165. Movements against market reform may be attributable to disparity in wealth during
transition years, especially within the context of high inflation and unemployment rates.
James P Nehf, Empowering the Russian Consumer in a Market Economy, 14 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 739, 742 (1993).
166. Yaroslav Lissovolik, Cost of Fiscal Populism, Moscow TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. For a discussion of post-Cold War
opening of markets in Russia, see generally David F Black, Note, So You Want to Invest
in Russia? A Legislative Analysis of the Foreign Investment Climate in Russia, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 123 (1996).
167 See generally Scott P Boylan, Essay, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia:
Implications for U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1999 (1996).
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In addition to subverting national economies, bribery fosters a second,
more micro-level form of waste - the dissipation of scarce corporate
resources. When bribes assess extra costs rather than simply shift or re-
categorize existing costs, contract winners pay more than they would in the
absence of bribery For this reason, some busmesspersons have voiced an
appreciation that the FCPA keeps "outrageous demands at bay "" Former
Texaco President James Kinnear has stated his belief that the FCPA is a
help rather than a hindrance to U.S. businesses, providing a way to save
face while refusing to pay bribes. 69 In this manner, the law can be evoked
by American executives who resent the wasteful diversion of scarce re-
sources towards corrupt ends, 70 but want a basis for graciously refusing to
make a solicited payment.'
B. The United States Must Encourage Adoption of FCPA-Style
Legislation Abroad to Eliminate Competitive Disadvantage
to U.S. Firms in International Markets
Supporters of the original FCPA cited literature suggesting that alleged
competitive disadvantage for U.S. firms was illusory and that blaming the
FCPA for trade deficit woes was simplistic." Given the spate of data
generated to support either side of most controversies, FCPA detractors
could likewise provide their own statistics, attesting to the harm suffered by
U.S. businesses under the legislation.173
168. Keith Rockwell & Richard Lawrence, Revised Corruption Law Gets Mixed
Reviews, J. COM., Nov 1, 1988, at 1A.
169. See James W Kinnear, Retired President and Chief Executive Officer, Texaco,
Inc., Address Before the 35th Annual Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference (Apr. 19,
1995), in 61 VrrAL SPEECHES 561, 562 (1995).
170. For example, transactions for munitions, telecommunications equipment, heavy
equipment, and services sometimes bear costs inflated by five, ten, or fifteen percent.
Richard Aim, Brave Few Battle Corruption in Global Business, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 14, 1994, at ID.
171. See Glenn A. Pitman & James P Sanford, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Revisited: Attempting to Regulate "Ethical Bribes" in a Global Business, INT'L J. PURCHAS-
ING & MATERIALS MGMT., June 22, 1994, at 15 ("Americans have learned to utilize the
FCPA m a bribery-prone climate. Many find that the FCPA gives them the basis to refuse
a solicitation of a bribe.').
172. See Bader & Shaw, supra note 139, at 646-47 ("Statistics contradict the perception
that the FCPA has hindered U.S. sales abroad. Placing the blame for balance of trade
woes on the FCPA is simplistic.").
173. See Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US
Exports, 12 MGRL. & DECIS. ECON. 295, 301 (1991) (finding that FCPA has hurt U.S.
exports to non-Latin American "bribery countries").
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Some commentators continue to provide evidence suggesting that the
costs to U.S. businesses of complying with the FCPA have not been prohib-
itive.174 Recently, however, an increasing number of FCPA defenders have
adopted a new approach. Rather than suggest that the FCPA's burden on
U.S. businesses is exaggerated, these commentators concede that unilateral
adoption of the FCPA is economically harmful to American firms compet-
ing abroad." 5 The solution, they contend, is not for the United States to
abandon its purportedly virtuous position, but rather to campaign aggres-
sively for the adoption of FCPA-type legislation throughout the world. 176
The contrast between the FCPA's strict prohibition of overseas bribes
and the absence of similar legislation throughout the rest of the world
creates a lopsided playing field."r Most commentators today agree that
U.S. businesses are disadvantaged m the global marketplace 17  by the
uniquely stringent standards to which they are held m regard to the payment
of bribes. Statistics and studies aside, logic suggests that some competitive
disadvantage is likely to result from the imposition of the FCPA's excep-
tional restrictions. If bribes are either necessary or conducive to the award
of business contracts in some environments, 179 a unilateral crimial prohibi-
174. See Mary Jane Sheffet, The Foreign Corrpt Practices Act and the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did They Change Corporate Behavior?, 14 J. PUB. POL'Y
& MARKETING 290, 297 (1995) (citing survey data suggesting that FCPA compliance costs
have not eliminated business abroad, and that U.S. products are still in demand in global
markets).
175. For a discussion of the competitive disadvantage faced by U.S. firms due to the
unilateral nature of the FCPA's restrictions, see Business Accounting and Foreign Trade
Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on S. 708 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and the
Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., at 74-75 (1981) (statement of Earnest Johnston, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State).
176. See Michael D. Sandler, Advising Lawyers of Cross-Border Developments, NAT'L
LU., Aug. 7, 1995, at D6 (noting that although U.S. businesspersons see FCPA as handi-
cap, most Americans believe law would be appropriate if competitors from all nations were
bound by such rules).
177 Michael Skol, Out from Under the Table: Governments Forge Ahead with Anti-
Corruption Efforts, Bus. MnX., Feb. 1996, at 23, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
178. This disadvantage may be especially pronounced because some of our most
competitive rivals, such as Japan, Germany, and France, are frequently cited as the domi-
ciles of those companies that win contracts over U.S. firms by paying bribes. See Amy
Borrus, A World of Greased Palms: Inside the Dirty War for Global Business, BUS. WK,
Nov 6, 1995, at 36, 37
179. Payment of bribes would be irrational if they were neither necessary nor conducive
to the award of business contracts. Bribes always mcur the cost of the payment made and
sometimes mcur the risk of prosecution under local domestic antibribery laws. Even
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tion will Impose a handicap on the companies it governs. In systems where
payment of bribes is necessary, U.S. firms m compliance with the law will
be precluded from competing. The sphere of possible business settings
overseas will be circumscribed. In systems where payment of bribes is
advantageous rather than essential, U.S. competitors will still be able to
compete, but will be disadvantaged by the FCPA's restrictions.
Cases abound in which U.S. firms have lost business by refusing to
pay illegal bribes sought by foreign officials. One study suggests that U.S.
companies lost $45 billion of international business in 1994 alone to mter-
national competitors that paid bribes."i ' Moreover, a classified report
compiled by U.S. intelligence agencies predicts that U.S. businesses will
be seriously disadvantaged in bidding for $1 trillion m international capital
projects against foreign compames that pay bribes.' Secretary of Com-
merce Ron Brown recently testified before the House International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade Subcommittee that in two hundred cases of bribery
and extortion recently studied, U.S. exporters lost half the sales, totaling
$25 billion."8
Opinions diverge, however, in regard to the best way to achieve a
more level field of competition. Two obvious but diametrically opposed
policy approaches have the potential to place all nations on equal footing -
convincing the rest of the world to ban extraterritorial payment of bribes or
repealing the FCPA so that American companies can compete for foreign
business by paying bribes as freely as companies in other countries do.
Supporters of the FCPA approach to extraterritorial bribe payments
reason that because bribery is both morally wrong and economically dys-
functional, the global playing field should be balanced by "getting the rest
of the world to raise its standards, not [finding] ways to lower U.S.
standards."'1 This approach has been adopted by the OECD, which m
1994 recommended that members take steps to prevent the bribery of
accounting for frequent irrationality, the flourishing of bribery in global markets is likely
to reflect the existence of distinct business advantages conferred in exchange for at least
some of the payments.
180. Borrus, supra note 178, at 36.
181. Robert S. Greenberger, Foreigners Use Bribes to Beat U.S. Rivals in Many Deals,
New Report Concludes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1995, at A3.
182. Hearng of the House Int'l Relations Comm., Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade Sub-
comm., on U.S. Export Promotion Program, Oct. 12, 1995, FED. NEWS SERVICE, available
m LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (testimony of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown).
183. See Focus on "Controlling the Climate". Reducing Corruption Worldwide, CoRP.
CouNs. AcTIVrr UPDATE, Mar. 1996, at 20 (quoting Fritz Heiann, Chairman of
Transparency International-USA).
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foreign officials m the process of transacting international business. 1
Likewise, the OAS has drafted an Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption.'
Some suggest that foreign FCPA-style legislation might even create a
competitive advantage for American busmesses." U.S. firms would be
able to exploit years of unilateral experience m competing on the basis of
market-oriented advantages."s Having survived and thrived for years
without making corrupt payments, U.S. businesses that have complied with
the FCPA would be insulated from transitional strains that foreign firms
would likely experience as they move toward more stringent antibribery
policies. To the degree that learning-curve benefits associated with early
FCPA adoption would disproportionately assist American companies, it
is arguably m our national interest to encourage multilateral enactment
of FCPA-style laws as the preferred means of leveling the global playing
field.
C. Vagueness and Chilling Effect Charges Lodged
Against the FCPA Are Spurious
Another way to defend the FCPA is to rebut critics' charges that the
FCPA's vagueness creates a chilling effect on the transaction of lawful
business by U.S. firms." Logically, two approaches can be taken, each
of which is discussed in a separate subpart. The first approach suggests
that the FCPA is not unduly vague, and the second approach suggests that
any unavoidable vagueness is not the source of significant chilling effects.
1. Arguments That the FCPA Is Not Unduly Vague
Among the terms of the 1977 legislation challenged for purported
ambiguity were "corruptly," "in furtherance of," "foreign official," "obtain-
mg or retaining business," and "knowing or having reason to know "9 In
response to continuing allegations of vagueness, supporters can contend that
184. OECD Press Release, OECD Governments Agree to Combat Bribery, SG/Press
94(36), May 27, 1994 (visited Jan. 23, 1997) <http:lwww.oecd.orgldaflcmislbribrecm.
htm#1994>
185. See supra notes 19-26, 177
186. Arthur T. Downey, No Time for Complacency on Corporate Corruption, CONN.
L. Tram., July 1, 1991, at 24.
187 Id.
188. For a discussion of vagueness and chilling effect issues, see mfra notes 220-71 and
accompanying text.
189. Longobardi, supra note 84, at 443.
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the alterations enacted m 1988 were effective remedies of the purported ills
of the 1977 predecessor.
Arguably, the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA have reduced or elirm-
nated the most troublesome sources of vagueness. The most critical of
these is the scienter requirement for a statutory violation. Congress re-
placed the slippery 1977 "reason to know" standard with the purportedly
clearer "knowledge" standard,"g which requires a "firm belief' that unlaw-
ful activity is "substantially certain to occur," '191 or awareness "of a high
probability" of a violation."m The replacement of an objective assessment
of what the defendant should have known with a subjective assessment of
the defendant's actual knowledge may remove one element of peril to
businesses operating abroad - the invocation of criminal liability on the
basis of carelessness or negligent lack of awareness or vigilance. 19 Tis
reduces the systematic risk to U.S. businesses operating abroad under the
FCPA.
A second important source of vagueness that was arguably addressed
by the 1988 Amendments relates to the distinction between legal and illegal
payments. The 1977 FCPA's authorization of payments to officials whose
duties were essentially ministerial or clerical left substantial room for
interpretation. The FCPA was criticized for creating a category of excep-
tions that was frequently unusable, as decisionmakers feared their assess-
ments of qualifying recipients would diverge from assessments made during
the process of litigation." 4 The 1988 Amendments attempt to reduce or
eliminate this source of vagueness by shifting the exception from the
function of the official to the purpose of the payment"9 and by providing
a representative listing of permitted payments.", Some observers interpret
this change to cover "virtually every commonly performed governmental
act except those involving an exercise of discretion by a foreign official for
190. See supra note 98.
191. See supra note 99.
192. See supra note 100.
193. For an assessment of the effectiveness of the 1988 Amendments at adequately
clarifying the FCPA's coverage and application, see The New Trade Act: Tools for Export-
ers, Bus. AM., Oct. 24, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter The New Trade Act].
194. Id. at 3.
195. The purported reduction of risk here may be attributable, at least m part, to the
fact that the payer of a bribe has a better understanding of the purpose of the bribe than of
the essential responsibilities of the official to whom the bribe is being made. Accordingly,
the payer should experience increased confidence in the accuracy of her assessment of any
payment under the revised standards for permitted payments.
196. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. ' As we shall see in the
following Part, some business entities have nonetheless barred all payments
to foreign officials because of continuing concerns about statutory vague-
ness. 1
98
2. Arguments That Any Unavoidable Vagueness Is Not
the Source of Significant Chilling Effects
Another argument against the vagueness critique challenges the very
notion of a chilling effect, particularly in light of protection embodied in
various government practices and procedures created to help managers
better understand the coverage of the FCPA. The Department of Com-
merce and the DOJ provide interpretive assistance. The Department of
Commerce provides nonbinding advice regarding FCPA compliance issues,
but does not guarantee confidentiality to those who seek the Department's
counsel." DOJ review procedures'm are likely to be more helpful. The
procedures require the DOJ to issue opinions in response to business
inquires within thirty days of receipt of all necessary information." The
DOJ has agreed to indicate its enforcement intentions under specific circum-
stances in response to letters of inquiry I Moreover, an opinion letter of
the Attorney General authorizing an activity under the review procedures
creates a rebuttable presumption that the activity is lawful.' Guidance
from the DOJ is not binding m subsequent litigation.' Although the SEC
is not officially bound by DOJ reviews, it has agreed not to bring civil
actions regarding payments ruled lawful by a review letter.' The avail-
ability of preliminary review letters provides businesses with some protec-
tion against statutory vagueness, which mitigates potential chilling effects.'
197 Jere W Morehead & Sandra G. Gustavson, Complying with the Amended Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, RISK MGMT., Apr. 1990, at 76, 78.
198. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
199. Arthur Aronoff, Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, PLI
CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. B4-7074, June
30, 1994, at 69.
200. For details of the DOJ's review procedures, see 28 C.F.R. 80 (1996).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e) (1994).
202. 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1996).
203. Id. § 80.10.
204. Aronoff, supra note 199, at 67
205. Statement of Commission Policy, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, 45 Fed.
Reg. 59,001, 59,002 (1980).
206. This argument may be more useful in theory than in practice, as the seeking of
letters from a bureaucratic agency preliminary to pursuit of a business opportunity can be
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Even without such protective devices, the FCPA's chilling effect on
U.S. business abroad may be exaggerated. Because legislation ultimately
entails the use of language, absolute avoidance of ambiguity in drafting any
statute is impossible.' If the existence of some ambiguity were to operate
as an ultimate deterrent to the adoption of legislation, Congress would
never pass a statute. Arguably, the critical question is not whether the
FCPA contains ambiguity, but whether it contains so much ambiguity that
it has an insupportably harmful effect on U.S. business.
FCPA supporters can argue that any vagueness m the Act is reasonably
manageable. They can identify tactics that legal authorities have offered to
protect U.S. businesses against unintended liability under the FCPA. For
example, Brown recommends the development of written company policies
for selecting and retaining foreign sales representatives, use of written
agreements governing relationships with foreign marketing representatives,
background investigations of such representatives, use of opinion of counsel
in interpreting applicable laws, employee certification that foreign represen-
tatives of the company have been personally interviewed, utilization of the
DOJ review procedures, and vigilance for a number of "red flags" as means
of exercising due diligence in good faith efforts to comply with the
FCPA. 8 Likewise, Bialos and Husisian discuss in detail an array of
warnings that can be part of due diligence efforts to ensure FCPA compli-
ance.2°9 This kind of artillery may soften the purported harshness of the
FCPA's application to U.S. businesses. To the extent that such weapons
can avert hapless violations, the image of the FCPA as a land mine may be
hyperbole.
time-consuming and cumbersome. At the very least, the process impedes the ability of
cautious U.S. firms to seek business opportunities abroad, creating a competitive disadvan-
tage. These shortcomings may be exacerbated by what some consider to be an inflexible
approach taken by the DOJ in the issuance of opinion letters. See Bribes in Russia: Just Say
No?, 6 Russ. & ComoNwEA TH Bus. L. REP., Sept. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File (citing characterization of DO by Robert Vagt).
207 See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) ("[Flew
words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, [therefore] most statutes must deal
with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of
discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators
can spell out prohibitions.").
208. H. Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery
Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 260, 283-290
(1994).
209. Jeffrey P Bialos & Gregory Husisian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Select
Issues in the FSU and Other Transitional Economies, 5 CENT. EuR. Bus. GUIDE, Aug. 1,
1995, available in 1995 WL 10085203.
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IV Arguments Against Criminalizing
the Payment of Bribes Abroad
Arguments against crnm alizmg the payment of bribes abroad include
contentions that (a) the FCPA imposes a competitive disadvantage upon
U.S. firms operating abroad; (b) market mechanisms can provide more
effective, less costly, less severely punitive means of inhibiting international
corruption than the FCPA, and (c) condemnation of bribery is a cultural
construct, so that efforts to control bribery m other nations may constitute
moral imperialism. These arguments are addressed individually in the
following subparts.
A. The FCPA Imposes a Competitive Disadvantage Upon
U.S. Firms Operating Abroad
Since the late 1970s, critics of the FCPA approach have suggested that
the United States's unique hard-line legislation puts American businesses at
a competitive disadvantage in world markets.2"' They argue that U.S.
businesses are effectively foreclosed from seeking business m areas where
the tendering of questionable payments, gifts, or gratuities is an essential
or important component of dealmakmg.21 ' Although this disadvantage
would be expunged were all countries to adopt the tough antibribery stance
of the United States, FCPA detractors suggest that persuading the world to
embrace the FCPA's stance is extremely unrealistic.2" Accordingly, while
payment of bribes remains a common, accepted practice m many parts of
the world,213 blanket prohibition of bribe payments by U.S. companies
overseas is harmful to both the American economy and individual American
businesses.
210. See Christopher L. Hall, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Com-
petitive Disadvantage, butfor How Long?, 2 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP L. 289, 303-06 (1994)
(summarizing arguments that FCPA places U.S. firms at competitive disadvantage). See
generally Edward L. Hudgins, 36 Ways to Narrow the U.S. Trade Deficit, HERITAGE
FOUND. REP No. 457, Sept. 24, 1985 (suggesting that FCPA places U.S. exporters at
disadvantage relative to European and Japanese competitors).
211. See Tamara Adler, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977- A Step
Toward ClarOfcation and Consolidation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1740, 1749
(1982).
212. See Earle, supra note 136, at 209 (observing that proponents of FCPA-approach
are sometimes characterized as excessively idealistic and unrealistic, "the equivalent of Don
Quixote tilting at windmills"); Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of
International Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Is Not the
Answer, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 3, 15 (1995) (observing that current attempts to
develop multilateral agreement on FCPA-style legislation are likely to fail).
213. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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Under this "avoidance of economic harm" argument against the FCPA,
the price of being the lone bearer of a umque standard of behavior abroad is
ever increasing. As one observer notes, the original version of the FCPA
was adopted when the United States maintained a majority of the world's
direct foreign investment (DFI).2"4 Since that time, our portion of the
world's DFI has dropped to twelve percent, in deference to business gains
realized primarily in Europe and Asia.2"' If these losses are even partially
attrbutable to impediments created by the relatively stringent standards of the
FCPA, the United States may be unable to compete m the global markets of
the future while fettered by the FCPA's handicap.
Beliefs that elevating all countries to the FCPA's lofty moral climate
would remove the handicap appear to be unrealistic. Bribery is an mtransi-
gent global reality that is unlikely to disappear any time soon. In recent
years, some of our closest allies, including France, Germany, Britain, and
Japan, have resisted U.S. efforts to sell FCPA-style legislation to other
countries.21 6 Industrialized countries experiencing high unemployment see
jobs supplied by overseas contracts, as well as the bribes that help to secure
the contracts, as essential to national welfare. 217 Likewise, bribery of public
officials is considered a virtual precondition to the conduct of business in a
number of developing countries. Perhaps because the stakes for many
nations are so high, efforts to persuade other countries to adopt more strin-
gent laws have proved extremely frustrating.
219
As noted earlier, FCPA supporters might contend that the 1988 Amend-
ments mitigate the competitive disadvantage to U.S. companies by clarifying
FCPA prohibitions, thereby reducing chilling effects on marginal but legal
activities.' In response to this argument, detractors can make two asser-
tions: first, that total statutory clarity and concomitant avoidance of any
chilling effect cannot expunge the disadvantages of the FCPA's unilateral
restraints on U.S. businesses; second, that supposed improvements m FCPA
clarity are illusory, so that the 1988 Amendments do little to reduce compli-
214. Andrew W Singer, Ethics: Are Standards Lower Overseas?, ACROSS BOARD, Sept.
1991, at 31, 33 (citing comments of R. John Cooper, Executive Vice President and General
Counsel of advertising agency Young & Rubicam, Inc.).
215. Id.
216. Rosle Waterhouse, The Sleazy State: Britain "Resisting Moves to Halt Bribes to
Officials," INDEPENDENT, Mar. 16, 1994, at 3.
217 See generally Chaddock, supra note 157
218. See William L. Jennings & Craig A. Gillen, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at C10.
219. See Muffler, supra note 212, at 13-16.
220. See supra Part III.C.
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ance anxiety221 associated with gray-area situations. I American managers
who do business abroad continue to emphasize the complexity of social and
economic systems m other countries, as well as the difficulty of understand-
mg varieties of fees, the purpose and legality of which are frequently ob-
scure.
223
Some commentators even suggest that the SEC and the DOJ have
intentionally avoided providing interpretational guidelines to the FCPA,
fearing that such aids could foster its circumvention. 21 This kind of regula-
tory approach actually seeks a certain amount of chilling effect at the margins
of legality, under the theory that risk aversion under conditions of ambiguity
will ensure the most rigorous possible self-enforcement. '
FCPA opponents can also challenge the notion that DOJ review proce-
dures mitigate the chilling effects of statutory imprecision. Longobardi
observes that only eighteen requests for review were made during the first
six years that the procedures were available. This small number may
reflect significant limitations of the review process, such as the nonbinding
nature of DOJ review letters' and the DOJ's refusal to grant review letters
precedential effect.m Whatever the reason, few U.S. businesses appear to
221. Compliance anxiety results from the possibility of inadvertently violating the law.
According to one commentator, the opportunities to run afoul of the FCPA are greater today
than ever before. See Jeffrey L. Snyder, International Operations: Managing the Risks, N.Y.
L.J., May 20, 1996, at S4.
222. See John E. Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT'L LAW. 1009, 1017
(1990) ("[R]elatively minor 1988 amendments to the FCPA are unlikely to change the way a
U.S. corporation makes sales abroad. Wherever the line is drawn in any particular case
between permissible and imperrmssible behavior, people will wish to be comfortably within
the permissible zone.").
223. See, e.g., Richard Korman, On Corruption, All's Relative, ENGINEERING NEWS-
REC., July 24, 1995, at 31 (noting observations of U.S. busmessperson in regard to transac-
tions in Mexico).
224. See, e.g., Scott J. Lochner, Note, The Crrunalization of Amencan Extraterritorial
Bribery: The Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 645, 654 (1981).
225. This rational yet perverse legislative approach to clarity is not uncommon. Lawmak-
ers have declined to provide a statutory definition of insider trading, for example, out of fear
that a precise definition will allow creative individuals to find loopholes that evade the spirit
of the law. See H.R. REP No. 98-355, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2287-88.
226. Longobardi, supra note 84, at 465.
227 Opinion letters from the Attorney General authorizing an activity under DOJ review
procedures create a rebuttable presumption that the activity is lawful. See supra note 203 and
accompanying text. The rebuttability of the presumption implies that the letters cannot be
considered absolutely binding.
228. See Longobardi, supra note 84, at 472; see also Aronoff, supra note 199, at 69.
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see the review procedures as a valuable tool for assessing gray areas of
statutory application. The procedures play a small role in mitigating any
chilling effects associated with the ambiguity of the FCPA.
Furthermore, the 1988 Amendments have made little progress in
approaching a precision that clearly distinguishes pennssible and prohibited
acts. Recall, for example, that the FCPA tries to distinguish among various
kinds of payments to foreign officials. Prohibited payments to receive pref-
erential treatment in the awarding of a government contract" 9 are different
from the permitted grease or facilitation payments that are needed to obtain
necessary services such as utilities and mail." ° The former class creates a
conflict of interest that undermines the objectivity of officials charged with
the public welfare; the latter class is relatively innocuous.3" Moreover,
some view standard grease payments as especially justifiable when they
function as a kind of direct taxation, 2 whereby users pay officials directly
for the routine services they perform.
Unfortunately, the 1988 Amendments do not always create a clear
distinction between illegal corrupt payments and permissible grease pay-
ments. Congress intended the latter to fall within the clause that permits
payments for "routine government actions." 3  As we have seen, this
standard replaced the 1977 FCPA language that permitted payments to
officials whose duties were essentially "ministerial" or "clerical, "I in order
to clarify the distinction between permissible and prohibited payments."
However, the discretion needed to determine what is a "routine" activity
may be equal to or greater than the discretion exercised to determine what
were minstenal or clerical duties under the old approach. Because the list
of routine activities contained in the statutory language is illustrative rather
than exhaustive, 6 an element of unavoidable discretion remains intact.
While the statutory examples may help business concerns to assess the
229. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a) (1994).
230. Id, §§ 78dd-1(b), -1(f)(3)(A), -2(b), -2(h)(4)(A).
231. Shaw differentiates bribes by distinguishing between "variance bribes" and
"transaction bribes"- a variance bribe is made to procure special treatment or dispensation,
whereas a transaction bribe facilitates or speeds actions that are generally available to all.
Bill Shaw, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Legal and Moral Analysis, 7 J. Bus. ETHIcs
789, 790 (1988).
232. See Susan Lun, Comption: Can It Be Stamped Out?, STRArrs TiMES (Singapore),
Oct. 8, 1995, at 1.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1994).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
235. See The New Trade Act, supra note 193.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A)(i) to -1(f)(3)(A)(iv) (1994).
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legality of other payments by analogy, the catchall category of payments
"similar" to those listed 7 ultimately retains an element of subjective inter-
pretation. Accordingly, the purported clarifications of the 1988 Amend-
ments may be partially or completely illusory
A common experience of business travelers abroad illustrates the
problem. In some countries, officials sporadically demand payment for the
release of a foreign guest's luggage at the border. 8 Although this type of
payment does not fall within the classically corrupt framework of purchas-
ing a contractual preference, its status under the FCPA's language of
exemption is uncertain. On one hand, one could reasonably characterize
customs practices as routine, suggesting that the payment is permissible
under the dispensation for "routine governmental actions." 9 On the other
hand, the discretion exercised in any sporadic behavior is arguably mconsis-
tent with the concept of a routine action. Because the exacting of payment
occurs inconsistently, it has elements of harassment and potential discrim-
nation that ordinarily are nssing m truly "routine" payments. This ambi-
guity creates a quandary for the international business traveler: should she
pay a bribe for the release of her personal belongings? In so doing, is she
committing a crime under U.S. law9
The confusion created by the FCPA over this kind of question is
disturbing. Obviously, anxiety is raised in unfamiliar' and authoritarian" l
settings. Entry through customs into foreign countries evokes both unfamil-
iarity and authoritananism, thereby increasing apprehension. ' 2 Within this
context, while a majority might agree that it is odious for officials to
demand sporadic luggage-release payments, would they also concur that it
is wrong for the visiting alien to make the demanded payment? Although
arguments can be made on both sides of this issue, how many basically law-
237 Id. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A)(v).
238. Teresa Watanabe, Bribes Buy Trouble in New Korea, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1993,
at Al.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1994).
240. See Terry J. Paradine, Venturing Abroad: The Challenges of Emerging Economies,
RISK MGMT., July 1996, at 73 (discussing ways to reduce investor anxiety m unfamiliar
territory).
241. See Richard A. Ifft, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1469 n.81 (1983) (attributing
anxiety to exhibition of police authority).
242. See Timothy Harper, Tales from the Fronts: Will They Blink or Wink?, CRAIN'S
Cm. Bus., Sept. 16, 1991, at TI ("Most Americans who venture abroad are familiar with
the little flurry of internal anxiety that comes with walking past U.S. or foreign customs
officials - even if they're not carrying anything illegal and haven't exceeded the import
limits.").
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abiding American citizens would refuse to pay m this setting? In any event,
is the visitor's purported infraction so serious that she should be put in a
position of concern regarding possible criminal liability? Moreover, will
Americans who are risk averse be dissuaded by such quandaries from
transacting business abroad? These questions highlight two concerns: that
the FCPA sledgehammer may be poorly equipped to handle subtle moral
differences among various factual situations and that the FCPA's ambiguity
may deter busmesspersons from interacting m international markets.
Another type of payment of uncertain status under the "routine govern-
ment actions" exception is the payment to foreign officials to expedite
decisions.3' The position of this kind of payment under the 1988 Amend-
ments is unclear for three reasons. First, because payments made to hasten
government decisions are not specifically mentioned as a statutory example
of "routine governmental actions," a prospective payer must try to classify
decision-expedition payments by analogy As analogies rely on similarity
rather than identity of characteristics, 244 assessments of how closely two
situations resemble each other are by nature imprecise. Second, whenever
a prospective payer tries to assess qualification of a payment under the
routine governmental actions exception, she implicitly must know some-
thing about the nature of the payment. Iromcally, payers governed by the
FCPA are executing transactions in foreign environments 5 m which they
are particularly ill-equipped to assess the routine or exceptional nature of
the actions of officials. Finally, potential problems arise because of the
indeterminacy of language.' A foreign official requesting a payment to
"expedite" a decision may truly be seelng payment for speedy service or
may be using euphemistic language to describe a bribe paid for preferential
treatment in choosing one prospective contractual partner over another.
Language used by an official to soften the harshness of candor may express
overtures in terms of facilitation or expedition rather than the preferential
treatment that is actually being purchased. u7 Implications concerning what
243. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 67, at n.69.
244. See 1 COMPACT EDITION OF THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 304 (1971)
(defining "analogy" m terms of similarity, simile, and similitude).
245. The FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials, foreign parties and their
officials, candidates for foreign political office, and intermediaries through which members
of these groups are ultimately reached. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
246. For a discussion of the indeterminacy of language and the particular challenges it
poses m cross-cultural contexts, see Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict
in International Joint Ventures: The Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and
Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W RES. L. Rv 1221, 1240-44 (1993).
247 For example, so-called "expedition" payments to receive taxi licenses in Mexico
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expediting payments really entail may be communicated by a glance or a
tone of voice.' Even if the provisions of the 1988 Amendments were
crystal clear, the murky linguistic territory of transnational communica-
tions 9 could leave the prospective payer of a so-called facilitation or
expedition payment on unavoidably precarious ground. Accordingly, some
companies have adopted policies of routinely erring on the side of caution
to avoid possible overstepping.' These companies prohibit employees
from making not only preference-purchasing payments, but also grease
payments." Such policies demonstrate that the FCPA's chilling effect on
lawful behavior is no mere theoretical construct.
Legality of payments can be affected by another aspect of the indeter-
minacy of language - the fact that statutory language, fixed at the time of
enactment until future amendment, may be poorly suited for application to
dynamic environments. For example, while Congress clearly intended by
its chosen language to prohibit extraterritorial bribes to foreign officials,
foreign political parties and their officials, and candidates for political
office, and their agents,' the lines between public officials and the officers
of private firms has become increasingly blurred in countries whose mar-
kets are in transition from commuism to capitalism. As productive entities
move from public to private ownership, identifying their managers and
agents as clearly either governmental or nongovernmental officials can be
difficult.'si U.S. compames may reasonably err on the side of caution by
are actually mandatory payoffs, as those who do not pay the "mordida" will continually fail
the licensing examination. See Deroy Murdock, Yes, We Have No Tortillas, WASH. Tiams,
Jan. 4, 1996, at A15.
248. What comprises a bribe is complicated by this distinction between express and
implied bribes. U.A.E. Armed Forces policy acknowledges the subtleties of implied
bribery, allowing the Forces to "withdraw a contract from any contractor that offers or
attempts to offer an express or implied bribe." Charles S. Laubach, Selling to the Armed
Forces of the U.A.E.. Regulations, Tenders, and Buying Methods, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE
REP., Mar. 1991, at 13.
249. See Salbu, supra note 246, at 1240-44.
250. For example, after settling government charges under the FCPA by paying a
$500,000 penalty, Young & Rubicam adopted a policy of prohibiting its employees from
making grease payments so that it would avoid potential liability in the gray areas. Singer,
supra note 214, at 33. The move appears to be a pragmatic effort to comply with the
technicalities of the law rather than a respect for the philosophical approach of the law.
Following settlement of the claims, one executive labelled the FCPA's criminal provisions
"the most metaphysical felony I've ever pleaded guilty to." Lipman, supra note 46, at B4.
251. Lipman, supra note 46, at B4.
252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
253. Norman Givant, The Sword That Shields: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Protects
American Investments in China, CHINA Bus. REV., May/June 1994, at 29.
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avoiding lawful payments to executives who may no longer be considered
"foreign officials" of governmental agencies.
Another source of ambiguity under the FCPA is its scienter require-
ment. Replacement of the "reason to know" standard of the 1977 version
of the FCPA with a new, more rigorous scienter requirement25 may have
altered rather than eliminated sources of potential statutory vagueness. The
new knowledge requirement encompasses such potentially ambiguous states
of scienter or quasi-scienter as awareness or a firm belief that a circum-
stance is substantially likely to occur. This kind of standard may create as
many questions regarding the boundaries of the statute's coverage as existed
under the original FCPA language.
Consider that under the 1988 scienter standard, requiring agents to sign
nonbribery contractual provisions provides little or no protection to honest
managers.' If an agent breaches a nonbribery agreement by applying
some commission to the payment of a bribe, the principal can be held liable
simply for knowing that the agents she must use 2 6 sometimes pay bribes
despite exhortations to be honest.' Should such behavior be resistant to
254. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
255. See Ettore, supra note 14, at 20.
256. Forced or unavoidable use of agents m a country may be a function of laws,
protocols, or more pragmatic considerations such as the need to rely on persons who have
cultural, linguistic, or relational skills that are critical to the successful consummation of a
deal. Use of local consultants may also be necessary to work one's way through local
bureaucracies. See Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn C. Atkinson, United States-Latin American
Trade Laws, N.C.J. INT'L L. & CM. REG. 111, 160 (1995).
The forced use of local agents, and a concomitant loss of control over the selection of
persons upon whom U.S. managers must rely, is exacerbated in countries where entry is
actually or virtually limited to the development of joint ventures. For example, some
countries have historically limited foreign direct investment to firms that develop joint
ventures with host country entities. Some go so far as to require that the host country
venturer maintain majority ownership or control. See Salbu, supra note 246, at 1223-24.
In these instances, the loss of control occasioned by having to collaborate with host country
firms is compounded by low levels of control associated with minority ownership. The crux
of the problem in any of these instances lies in the fact that the quasi-involuntary arrange-
ment must inevitably confer upon the coventurers authority to act as agents of the venture,
thereby exposing the U.S. company to potential FCPA liability
257 Arguments to the contrary - i.e., that a principal always has control over an
agent's activities - may be predicated upon ethnocentric assumptions. For example, agents
in some cultures may view exhortations to eschew bribery as formalities toward technical
legal compliance, essentially presuming a wink on the part of the exhorter. It may be
difficult to persuade agents in this kind of cultural setting that no bribes really means no
bribes. Likewise, bribery may be so entrenched in some cultures that the exhortations are
uiversally ignored. This may occur because the nature of an agent's moral, social, and
legal obligations to obey the orders of the principal may differ within various cultural
contexts.
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the good faith efforts of U.S. managers, Amencans may effectively be
barred from doing business abroad.
Commentators observe that other gray areas remain unresolved under
the 1988 Amendments. 58 For example, foreign officials in China com-
monly demand payment of costs of foreign travel, purportedly to learn
more about foreign products. 9 Chinese inspectors likewise request trips
abroad, ostensibly to educate themselves regarding U.S. technology so they
can determine whether American contractors' projects should pass local
inspections.' The legitimacy of such expenditures becomes increasingly
questionable as the size of the payment grows. Whether the payments meet
statutory reqmrements sl - i.e., are "directly related to the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products and services; or the execu-
tion or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof 2 - is also a question of degree. Obvious difficulties in assessing
coverage under this language will be associated with the level of opulence
of transportation, food, lodging, and amenities. Likewise, how much time
abroad must the foreign official spend assessing products and services, as
opposed to sightseeing during leisure hours or breaks, to remain in the
spirit of the affirmative defense? 3 Other ambiguous areas of coverage
include the sale of black market import licenses and the payment of fees for
inspection certificates.2'
Another term retained m the 1988 Amendments that potentially engen-
ders confusion is the corruption requirement. The statute prohibits persons
and entities from making "use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
258. See, e.g., Delia Poon, Note, Exposure to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Guide for U.S. Companies with Activities in the People's Republic of China to Minimize
Liability, 19 HASTIGS INT'L & COMP. L. RaV 327, 34041 (1996) (discussing several areas
in which coverage of particular practices under 1988 Amendments' prohibitions remains
unclear).
259. See id. at 341 n.92 (citing Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, EcON. INTELLI-
GENCE UNrr Bus. CHINA, Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Eiubc File).
260. See Givant, supra note 253, at 29.
261. See Poon, supra note 258, at 341.
262. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), -2(c)(2) (1994).
263. Admittedly, respondents to concerns about gray areas can persuasively argue that
middle-ground judgment calls are at some level unavoidable m any statutory construction.
For example, the tax deductibility of business expenses raises questions similar or identical
to those discussed m this paragraph. Nonetheless, the negative effects of ambiguity are
especially pernicious when millions or billions of dollars of foreign trade may be lost in
increasingly competitive markets, as executives exercise caution to avoid being charged with
crimial behavior under the FCPA.
264. See Poon, supra note 258, at 341-42.
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of interstate commerce corruptly m furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer,
gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value"'
to prohibited classes of recipients. Unfortunately for those hoping to under-
stand the requirements of FCPA compliance, "corruptly" is not among the
terms explained m the definitions section of the FCPA.
Courts provide little useful help to those seeking clarification. In
United States v Lebo, the defendant argued that the word "corruptly"
requires that the gift or payment at issue be intended as an inducement for
recipients to misuse their official positions and that the jury should be
instructed to differentiate between gifts or gratuities and bribes. 7 The
court ruled that "an act is 'corruptly' done if done voluntarily [a]nd mten-
tionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end
or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.""
This tautological explanation only reinforces the ambiguity of the adverb
"corruptly," and the "voluntarily" component of the test merely reiterates
an element of the statute's scienter requirement. Describing "corruptly" m
terms of "unlawful" ends is so circuitous, obvious, and redundant as to
offer little insight. Moreover, the idea that the phrase "bad purpose" helps
illumlnate the boundaries of corrupt behavior is suspect given that corrupt
activities are a more constrained category than the larger, more generic
sphere of acts with a "bad purpose."" Defining a relatively narrow con-
cept using a broader concept does nothing to help potential actors under-
stand the boundaries of the FCPA's coverage.
The practical outcome of all these examples of indeterminacy under the
FCPA is a chilling effect on U.S. business activity abroad. The ambiguity
we have examined, in tandem with the criminal penalties of the FCPA, will
deter U.S. compames from making payments that courts might ultimately
find legal in order to avoid the publicity, lawyers' fees, and potential fines
and incarceration that threaten at the margins. '70 The implications of this
265. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
266. Id. §§ 78dd-l(f), -2(h).
267 United States v Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
268. Id.
269. Under standard usage, not all bad acts are corrupt, whereas all corrupt acts are bad.
This distinction is based on the idea that corruption is comprised of some degree of rot, spoil-
age, contamination, or venality that is not characteristic of all bad purposes. See WEBSTER'S
NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 319 (2d ed. 1982). Because corruption is a specific kind of bad
activity, the use of bad purpose to define corruption falls to yield refinement or precision.
270. See GREANiAS & WINDSOR, supra note 60, at 97 (1982) (noting, in regard to 1977
FCPA, that "[t]he line between improper and proper payments is too ill-defined to admit of
270
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chilling effect are twofold - from a practical standpoint, it exacerbates the
competitive disadvantage that encumbers U.S. businesses operating in
global markets. From a philosophical perspective, it functions as govern-
mental overreaching into the realm of moral ambiguity best left to individ-
ual discretion in a free society 27
B. Market Mechanisms Can Provide a More Effective, Less
Costly, Less Severely Punitive Means of Inhibiting
International Corruption than the FCPA
Another pragmatic argument against the FCPA suggests that alterna-
tives exist that are more effective, less costly, and less harmful to U.S.
firms. Congress need not expose American companies to competitive dis-
advantage and unduly harsh criminal laws to fight bribery Likewise,
Congress can reduce corruption without forcibly imposing American values
beyond American borders. Tlis subpart will address an option that would
supplant the FCPA's approach - the development and utilization of market
mechanisms to foster transactional probity
How can market forces inhibit bribery? Consider this example. An
Ecuadorian refinery project has recently adopted a recommendation of
Transparency International that companies bidding for public contracts be
required to sign an antibribery pledge.' r A matching, local commitment
on the part of government officials to shun bribery' can be transformed
into an express contractual stipulation that bribes will not be accepted in the
process of selecting contract winners. As forces such as Transparency
International work to expose corruption,274 and as increasingly widespread
global circles adopt antibribery sentiments as a result of persuasion in the
risk-taking with regard to potential liability"). If the changes rendered by the 1988 Amend-
ments have indeed failed to resolve ambiguities, then Greamas's and Windsor's observation
remains pertinent to the FCPA m its present form.
271. For discussion of the importance of retaining individual discretion m moral
evaluation, both generally and in international and cross-cultural contexts specifically, see
generally Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-
Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101 (1992); and Steven R. Salbu, True Codes
Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the Preservation of
Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 327 (1994).
272. Andrew Taylor, Singapore Exposes Tip of Corruption Iceberg - Efforts to Curb
Bribery m the Award of International Contracts Are in Their Infancy, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1996, at 4.
273. Id.
274. For a discussion of Transparency International's programs and influence, see supra
notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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marketplace of ideas,275 companies have growing incentives to protect their
reputations against imputations of corruption. The adoption of contract
terms prohibiting both the payment and the acceptance of bribes could
thrive under these conditions and serve as a potential alternative to FCPA-
style cininalization.
The approach obviously has both disadvantages and advantages.
Critics might question the likely effectiveness of isolated, voluntary anti-
corruption commitments in eradicating rampant bribery throughout the
world.276 Such justifiable skepticism is grounded in a realism that recog-
nizes the intransigence of the problems this Article has examined.'
Respondents can counter, however, that the FCPA has likewise made few
incursions into the widespread custom of paying bribes.27 Moreover, the
use of voluntary antibribery contract provisions brings the potential benefits
of market-based approaches to social change. 9  Foremost among these
benefits is a high degree of transparency Companies paying bribes in the
absence of the FCPA would be breaking no U.S. laws and would therefore
have less motivation to hide their activities. Companies that agree to
contractual terms forbidding the payment or receipt of bribes have mcen-
fives to publicize their probity Reputations of companies and governments
alike will be cast into higher profile by either the presence or the absence
of antibribery contract provisions.' Markets and projects in which partici-
pants openly and voluntarily pledge themselves against corruption become
"islands of integrity"'" that are attractive to entities concerned with their
honor and community standing. In short, illumination of voluntary behav-
275. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
276. See Hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on Drug Trafficking and Interna-
tional Orgamzed Crime, CONG. TESTIMONY, FED. Doc. CLEARiNG HOUsE (July 30, 1996),
available m LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (testimony of Robert Leiken suggesting that
problem is "fact of business life," firmly entrenched in global marketplace).
277 See supra Part I.B.
278. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the low faith
that middle-level and upper-level managers have in the ability of legislation to reduce
bribery of foreign officials, see William F Jung, Note, Recognizing a Corporation's Rights
Under the Indictment Clause, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv 477, 504 n.196.
279. See generally Skol, supra note 177
280. Unilateral adoption of the noncompulsory antibribery clauses can confer generic
public relations benefits, as well as transaction-specific advantage, on the entities that agree
to be bound by the terms. The process has the potential to focus a spotlight on the moral
stances of particular countries and companies, whereas the approach of the FCPA has
encouraged the perpetuation of a shroud of furtiveness covering the activities of governments
and firms alike.
281. See Lim, supra note 232, at 1.
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iors creates market pressures that may have greater potential to ameliorate
corruption than the largely ineffectual hard-line approach of the FCPA.?
A market-based approach obviously depends on the ongoing develop-
ment of transparency, so that information regarding companies' standards
and practices is widely available. Effective antibribery market mechanisms
also require serious efforts at political and econormc persuasion to convince
governments and businesses across the globe that rectitude in avoiding
bribery is an important component of the reputations of their institutions
and organizations.'
Both transparency and persuasion are becoming increasingly achievable
ends. U.S. intelligence surveillance identifies and discourages corruption.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)' and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI)l uncover bribery of foreign officials by companies in other
nations that compete against American firms for various business opportum-
ties. As intelligence surveillance mechanisms identify bribes prohibited by
local law, the United States can press governments to rescind corruptly
purchased contracts in favor of the lowest honest bidder. Informal pres-
sures will suppress bribery abroad, gradually leveling the playing field
without resort to the FCPA and its negative effects.'
282. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
283. It is important at this juncture to emphasize the difference between persuasion and
extraterritorial operation of laws from the standpoint of allegations of moral imperialism.
Where extraterritorially applied statutes such as the FCPA exert the influence of legal
compulsion abroad, persuasion seeks others' voluntary adoption of beliefs and policies that
are marketed using the influence of reason. This distinction between force and influence
is a critical one, as nations seek to balance their strongly held moral systems against
considerations of cultural pluralism and sovereign autonomy Exertion of influence is fair,
relatively unofficious, and respectful of others' right to choose. An invasive, extraterritorial
exercise of power, such as an exertion of law, is subject to charges of moral imperialism.
284. See Thomas W Lippman, U.S. Seeks to Halt Illegal Payoffs by Foreign Corpora-
tions: State Wants Industrialized Nations to Stop Practice; CIA Trying to Uncover Bribery
That Costs Americans Contracts, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 1993, at A10.
285. Between the passing of the original FCPA and 1992, the FBI identified over four
hundred instances of misconduct. Marlene C. Piturro, Just Say Maybe, WORLD
TRADE, June 1992, at 86.
286. The effectiveness of U.S. intelligence activity m supporting a bribe-free global
playing field may be limited. Two impediments likely to inhibit CIA initiations are: (a) the
widespread proliferation of bribery of foreign officials throughout the world and (b) global
resentment of and hostility toward what is perceived as overreaching U.S. intelligence
activity
The first consideration reflects the global entrenchment and pervasiveness of bribery
Even a large, powerful agency like the CIA may have trouble thwarting pandemic activity
that is unorganized and decentralized and therefore difficult to control efficiently
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Some commentators suggest that the United States can also apply trade
sanctions to fight bribery abroad.' Should the problem of bribery m
foreign markets become sufficiently severe, sanctions could include the
application of tariffs and quotas."8 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
as amended s9 may provide the basis for a trade sanctions supplement2m or
alternative?9 to the FCPA. The Trade Act, as amended in 1988 under the
OTCA,292 grants the U.S. Trade Representative discretion to impose trade
sanctions for "unreasonable" or "discriminatory" policies and practices.'
Murphy suggests that wilful blindness toward and tolerance of bribery
may fit under the unreasonableness standard,29 which includes "toleration
by a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enter-
prises or among enterprises in the foreign country that have the effect of
restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial considerations,
access of United States goods or services to a foreign market."2' While
trade sanctions may be applied creatively either to supplement or to replace
The second consideration may be the more crucial one, as it bears potential ramifications
m the areas of foreign policy and global security Amidst sentiment that the United States
plays an insupportably expansive, unpenalistic role in extraterritorial activities and gover-
nance, it is not surprising that other nations have viewed CIA antibribery activities abroad
with suspicion and hostility See William Drozdiak, French Resent U.S. Coups in New
Espionage, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1995, at Al. Trading partners understandably resent the
use of U.S. spies to track deals, and critics have suggested that the practice is an mappropri-
ate effort to justify maintaining large CIA budgets m the years following the Cold War. See
Leslie Alan Horvitz, Telling Bids from Bribes, WASH. TIMES, Nov 20, 1995, at 34.
287 See Christopher B. Johnstone, White House Boosts Overseas Anti-Bribery Efforts,
JEI REP., Mar. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8315911 (discussing receptivity of U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to application of trade sanctions in response to corrupt
practices abroad).
288. See James Gerstenzang, U.S. to Crack Down on Foreign Trade Bribery, L.A.
TiMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at Dl.
289. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
290. See generally Mark J. Murphy, Note, International Bribery: An Example of an
Unfair Trade Practice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385 (1995) (recommending application of
Trade Act of 1974 to supplement existing efforts to eradicate bribery, such as FCPA).
291. See id. Although the argument that trade sanctions can and should replace the
FCPA is philosophically different from the argument that trade sanctions should supplement
the FCPA, each approach depends on the effectiveness of trade sanctions in the reduction
or elimination of bribery
292. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1994)).
293. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1).
294. See Murphy, supra note 290, at 406.
295. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
BRIBERY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET
the FCPA, critics must examine this option carefully to ensure that the
trade sanctions are not subject to the same flaws as the FCPA. Specifi-
cally, those who consider the FCPA overreaching, intrusive, or disrespect-
ful of the sovereignty and autonomy of other nations may find the applica-
tion of trade sanctions objectionable for many of the same reasons.2
C. Condemnation of Bribery Is a Cultural Construct,
Therefore Efforts to Control Bribery in Other
Nations May Constitute Moral Imperialism
Commentators have observed that Americans abroad should acknowl-
edge cultural differences and avoid imposing controversial values on hosts
operating in their own countries.2" The disturbing image of the ugly,
ethnocentric American stands in bold relief when Congress imposes its will
beyond the confines of the United States. Legislative overreaching evokes
concerns that the United States is engaging m moral imperialism.298
296. Critics of the use of trade sanctions as a means of fighting global bribery are likely
to find some approaches more acceptable than others. To replicate entirely the invasiveness
of the FCPA, the U.S. government would have to apply trade sanctions to nations that fail
to prohibit extraterritorial bribery by their own citizens. This approach fully mirrors the
FCPA's encroachment. Less severe approaches, such as the application of trade sanctions
to countries that exhibit a tolerance of bribery within their own borders, differ m principle
from the FCPA. Although such sanctions certainly reflect and encourage the adoption of
certain values that are well entrenched m U.S. culture, they are less peremptory than the
FCPA. Such sanctions function as part of a commercial incentive system rather than
dictating behaviors m foreign countries. Likewise, sanctions for tolerance of bribery apply
pressure only to change market characteristics internally In contrast, sanctions against
countries that fail to adopt FCPA-type legislation would apply pressure to emulate the
United States using what some consider unwarranted meddling and interference.
297 See, e.g., Kent Hodgson, Adapting Ethical Decisions to a Global Marketplace,
MGMT. REv., May 1992, at 53, 54.
298. See, e.g., C. William Verity, Restoring the Yankee Trader of Old, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 20, 1980, at 11 (disparaging as moral imperialism United States tendency to dictate
concepts of right and wrong to other countries). Supporters of the FCPA rebut such clais
of moral imperialism by asserting the universal nature of antibribery values. Aigner, for
example, contends that anti-FCPA arguments lodged m terms of moral imperialism are
spurious. Dennis J. Aigner, The Rending Clash of Philosophic Virtue and Economic Reality,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov 5, 1995, at G3, available in 1995 WL 10765018. He notes
that although bribery may be routine in some countries, the practice is generally deplored
under the laws of those nations and by people of those nations. Id. He also cites the role
bribery has played in the downfall of various governments as evidence of antibribery
sentiments within socio-legal structures of the nations at issue. Id.
Noonan observes that bribery is consistently crimmalized throughout the world.
NOONAN, supra note 159, at 702. He adds that the universally surreptitious nature of
payments indicates a generic social rejection of bribery Id. If condemnation of bribery is
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Extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, while permissible, is gener-
ally disfavored. Courts presume, for example, that congressional legisla-
tion is intended to apply exclusively within the territorial limits of the
United States.2' Although rebuttable,"o the presumption suggests that
while Congress has the authority to exercise its control abroad, it ordinarily
declines to do so. FCPA detractors can argue that such restraint reflects a
prudent recognition of the dangers of American moral imperialism.
The prospect of moral imperialism is especially troubling if bribery is
viewed as a cultural construct. It is easy to justify the establishment and
imposition of universal rules when a behavior, like murder or rape, can be
identified as morally unacceptable under all conditions, for all people.
These are instances in which the behavior would violate what Donaldson
and Dunfee call "hyper-norms," referring to principles that are "fundamen-
tal to human existence."30' It is more troublesome when Americans impose
their values on other cultures in situations where right and wrong may be
determined legitimately, but with varying results, by agreements or rmcro-
social contracts within each society's "moral free space." 3" In these cases,
the absence of universalizable distinctions between right and wrong justifies
the adoption of values by consensus. If bribery falls within this area of
moral free space, the FCPA interferes with the legitimate creation and
operation of nicrosocial contracts around the world.
Lack of global consensus on the ethics of payments suggests a need to
relegate the issue to local authorities. As the Minister of Trade and Indus-
try in Indonesia has observed: "We do not have common standards on
indeed a ubiquitous value, claims that the FCPA imposes U.S. beliefs on other cultures lose
credibility
On the other hand, the presupposition that bribery is a universal value needs further
investigation. The identification of a number of governments that have tumbled due to
bribery scandals yields limited information. It does not tell us whether other nations exist
where various forms of bribery are considered acceptable. Likewise, political turbulence
attributed to bribery does not necessarily imply either a social consensus or a majority view
that any particular practice is mmoral. Because changes m government are not necessarily
democratic, inferences associating causes of change with purported majoritanan belief
systems are suspect.
299. See Foley Bros. v Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Because the presumption
of intraterritonal statutory limitation is not conclusive, but can be rebutted by evidence that
Congress intended extraterritorial application, federal statutes that reach activities outside
the United States are disfavored rather than prohibited. Id.
300. See id.
301. Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Busi-
ness Ethics: Integrative Social Contract Theory, 19 AcAD. MGMT. REv 252, 265 (1994).
302. See id. at 260-62.
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issues like corruption. Any effort to relate them to trade will be
detrimental to the functioning of the WTO m the future."" Indeed, what
many m the United States would call bribery may be seen as innocuous or
even admirable' through the lenses of other cultures. In the late 1980s,
Shariff and Lee identified a complex scheme of differences in the ways m
which gifts and gratuities are viewed in Japan, Kenya, Hong Kong, China,
South Korea, the Philippines, the former Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil,
and the United Kingdom.' The range of distinctions from one country to
the next' suggests that the FCPA may be poorly equipped to recognize and
respect subtle differences in acceptable business practices around the world.
Studies and reports continually confirm these differences. A study by
Fritzsche and others reveals that U.S. managers are likely to approach a
payoff scheme as a legal or ethical issue, whereas Asian managers are
likely to frame the scheme in terms of return on investment.' According
to Ming, payment of so-called "broker fees" to persons with strong connec-
tions to the government is considered honest m some societies.0 8 Likewise,
Johnstone observes that the tendering of expensive gifts in the course of
business is common, accepted practice in some Asian countries.' Whereas
Americans often view gift-givmg in business transactions as creating a con-
flict of interest,31 0 many people in countries like Japan consider gift-giving
303. Editorial, Is Corruption an Asian Value?, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1996, at A14.
304. Thus the Czech proverb, "If you don't steal from the state, you're stealing from
your family," arguably places bribery m the context of meeting familial responsibilities m
nations where payments to civil servants may be viewed as a source of legitimate opportu-
nity. See Sandrine Tolotti, Nations United in Sleaze, WORLD PREss REv., Jan. 1, 1996, at
18, available in 1996 WL 8399531 (reprinting portions of writing of Sandrme Tolotti,
appearing in leftist monthly Croissance).
305. See S. Shariff & Christina Lee, Fine Line Divides Customs, Crimes, J. CoM.,
Nov. 2, 1988, at 1A.
306. See id.
307 See David J. Fritzsche et al., Exploring the Ethical Behavior of Managers: A
Comparative Study of Four Countries, ASIA PAC. I. MGmT., Oct. 1995, at 37
308. See Chuang P Ming, Foreign Businessmen Welcome OECD's Anti-Corruption
Move, Bus. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at 3 (citing statement of Graham Hayward, Executive
Director of Singapore International Chamber of Commerce).
309. See Johnstone, supra note 287, at 8.
310. Several companies have recently incorporated rigorous restrictions into their codes
of ethics that forbid receiving gifts, entertainment, and gratuities from suppliers when a con-
ffict of interest would be created thereby These restrictions, which exceed those imposed
by staunch U.S. laws, stand in stark contrast to the laxity regarding receipt of gifts exhibited
by companies in other countries. For a discussion of General Motors' recently adopted
strict policy against receipt of gifts, entertainment, and gratuities, see Gabriella Stern &
Joann S. Lublin, New GMRules Curb Wming andDinmg, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1996, at B1.
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in business contexts to be proper etiquette. n The Japanese may see Ameri-
can qualms and punctiliousness about transaction-associated gift-giving as
a quirky artifact, an "American idiosyncracy ,"312 Moreover, a broad spec-
trum of gifts and social favors, ranging from lavish offerings to routine
hospitality, can be traded with a wide variety of motives, 313 so complicating
the task of winnowing the innocent from the corrupt as to render the effort
futile. Some commentators likewise question the purported dysfunction of
bribery, suggesting that paying bribes is not consistently associated with
underdevelopment or that it may facilitate economic development within
certain social and cultural fiameworks.314
These studies and observations validate the idea that bribery should
occupy a sphere of moral free space within which various cultures can
legitimately define the norms of appropriate behavior by consensus. In
contrast, the legal imposition of U.S. standards abroad is heavy-handed and
imperialistic. 15 Moreover, the aggressive imposition of culture-specific
values on other societies may engender resentment and hostility, potentially
placing unnecessary strain on international relations.316
The strongest arguments against the moral imperialism critique are
ultimately unpersuasive. One might suggest, for example, that the FCPA
applies only to U.S. entities, without imposing U.S. values on foreign
nations. This defense is maccurate. The FCPA's reach is not limited to
U.S. citizens and businesses. In Dooley v United Technologies Corp., the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia observed that the
FCPA applies not only to issuers or domestic concerns, but also to their
agents.317 The court addressed whether non-U.S. individuals or entities
could be prosecuted under the agents provision.18 Judge Green found
311. See Singer, supra note 214, at 32.
312. Id.
313. For a discussion of the variety of actions and motives that must be analyzed under
the heading of potential bribery, see Jack Mahoney, Gifts, Grease, and Graft, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1995, at 8.
314. For example, it has been suggested that corruption m Japan has been productive
and has generated growth in accordance with theories characterizing bribery as a means of
oiling economc machinery. See Tolotti, supra note 304, at 18 (referring to work of politi-
cal scientist Jean-Francois Bayart).
315. Muffler, supra note 212, at 29.
316. See, e.g., Paul Blustem, U.S. Target: Payoffs Abroad, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July
20, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (reporting Malaysian trade
minister's recent objection to what he perceives as cultural unperialism of U.S. anticorrup-
tion campaigns).
317 Dooley v United Techs. Corp., 803 F Supp. 428, 438-39 (1992).
318. See id.
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indications of statutory intent to cover foreign nationals m the FCPA's
penalty provision,319 which assesses fines to employees and agents of
domestic concerns who are U.S. citizens, nationals, or residents, or who
are "otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."3I The court
also found m the House of Representatives' conference report an intent to
cover foreigners who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction.32 Judge Green
concluded that the FCPA can even reach foreign individuals' activities
outside the United States, provided the United States has jurisdiction over
the defendants. 32 These findings suggest that the FCPA is highly ivasive.
It is simply maccurate to suggest that the FCPA is nonimpenalistic because
it circumscribes only the behaviors of American citizens and companies.3'
Another unpersuasive argument against charges of moral imperialism
is based on the FCPA's affirmative defense permitting payments and gifts
that are "lawful under the written laws and regulations" of a host country 32
FCPA defenders might suggest that the affirmative defense preserves the
dominance of local law over the encroachment of U.S. law However,
given the structure and limitations of the affirmative defense, any purported
319. See id. at 439.
320. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(B) (1988)).
321. See id. For relevant portions of the House conference report, see H.R. CONF
REP No. 95-831, at 14 (1977), reprnted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4126.
322. Dooley, 803 F Supp. at 440.
323. Had Dooley limited the FCPA's application to individuals and firms domiciled in
the United States, the FCPA would have remained subject to charges of moral imperialism.
Moral imperialism must be assessed not only at a micro level, but also at a macro level.
When a statute operating extraterritorially applies exclusively to U.S. individuals and
entities - i.e., only to the micro-level transactions of its own citizens and domciliaries -
it nonetheless exerts a macro-level influence on the cultures and economies of the country into
which it insinuates itself. From this macro-level perspective of broad cultural and economic
effects, the miperialism of extraterritorial application cannot be eliminated simply by assuring
that the transactors governed must hail from the United States. The statute operates m and
affects other nations and is founded upon ethical precepts. It reasonably follows that the
FCPA's macro-level invasiveness can be characterized as moral imperialism. The statute
extends to transactions in other countries and shapes their economic activity and development.
The proliferation of joint ventures throughout the world exacerbates this global encroach-
ment of the FCPA upon the autonomy of foreign firms. U.S. firms entering foreign markets
may find it helpful or necessaryto align themselves through joint ventures with local compa-
nies that are familiar with local laws, customs, and mores. Joint venture activity may be
necessary if the country the U.S. firm seeks to enter requires some percentage of local
ownership. See supra note 256. With these collaborative arrangements, the local compames
join their fortunes with those of the American coventurer. In the process, they can become
subject to the FCPA's rule, either directly through the operation of agency law or indirectly
by sharing the losses that are suffered by their U.S. partners.
324. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), -2(c) (1994).
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deference to local law is illusory The affirmative defense applies only
when payments that would be unlawful under the FCPA are expressly
authorized by a written law or regulation.325 Unfortunately, when payments
are, permissible in other countries, it is by default rather than by positive
authorization. By declining to designate payments as civil or criminal
infractions, the law implicitly authorizes them. Because countries permit-
ting payments do not expressly authorize them, a defense requiring written
authorization is unusable. The FCPA therefore crimmalizes activities of
U.S. companies abroad that are allowed under the host country's own rules.
This impressive reach of U.S. law is invasive, as well as disrespectful of
the host country's ability to determine the rules of operation within its own
sphere of influence.3'
V Analysis and Recommendations
The discussion to this point leads us to address two fundamental
questions of law and policy- (a) Should the United States continue to
support the FCPA, both as an Act of Congress and as a model statute to be
marketed to other nations?; and (b) If not, what alternative should we
pursue to reduce global bribery and corruption? This Part addresses these
two questions.
A. Should the United States Continue to Support the FCPA,
Both As an Act of Congress and As a Model Statute
to Be Marketed to Other Nations?
The FCPA is a suboptimal policy solution to the problem of bribery
This subpart demonstrates that while classic, preference-seeking bribery3"
is a harmful practice that we should seek to curb, FCPA-style legislation is
not the best way to achieve this end and is officious and insensitive to
cultural differences and issues of national sovereignty
1. Classic, Preference-Seeking Bribery Is a Harmful
Practice That We Should Seek to Curb
As we observed in some detail m Part II, payment of preference-
seeking bribes is economically dysfunctional and morally repugnant. It is
325. See id.
326. See Dale C. Turza, Corrupt Practices Act: How Far Have We Come?, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 5, 1990, at 5 (noting criticism of FCPA as "paternalistic attempt to set moral standards
for business conduct abroad").
327 Classic, preference-seeking bribes refer to payments made to wm a business deal,
in contrast to grease payments made to facilitate routine government action.
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economically dysfunctional because it binders economic growth,3 s exacts
agency costs,329 harms the quality of decisions made by public officials,33
impairs the accuracy of corporate financial statements, 331 reduces tax
revenues,332 inflates contract prices, 333 discourages mvestment, 33 increases
national debt,335 and squanders scarce government33 and corporate337 re-
sources. From a utilitarian perspective, 33 bribery is also morally repugnant
because it exacts all the above costs without yielding any social benefit.
Moreover, the payment of classic, preference-seeking bribes is dishonest,
and it dimniushes fairness of results in the marketplace.
In contrast with classic, preference-seeking bribes, we have seen that
a wide array of less clearly censurable payments are frequently made, with
varying purpose and effect. These kinds of payments occupy a far more
ambiguous position both economically and morally on a sliding scale of
finely graded practices ranging from seriously troublesome to innocuous.
Normatively ambiguous payments include the grease payments that the
FCPA permits, 339 as well as the many payments that supply do not fit easily
or clearly within the FCPA's provisionsY Moreover, practices considered
highly acceptable within other cultures, including payment of a variety of
"broker fees""3 1 and tendering of gifts to business clients as a form of
etiquette,3 2 suggest that the economic and moral ambiguity of many pay-
ments is exacerbated by the complexities of global pluralism and diversity
328. See Bribonomics, supra note 138, at 86.
329. See supra notes 142-44.
330. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 148-50.
332. See Pennar et al., supra note 143, at 133.
333. See Chaddock, supra note 157, (Int'l Global Report), at 1.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
338. Utilitaran analysis is an ethical analysis through which right behavior and mstitu-
tions are determined by trying to maximize social good. It entails application of a calculus
weighing social costs and social benefits. Rawls describes the central concept of utilitarian-
ism m terms of righteousness and justice being achieved when "major institutions are
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the
individuals belonging to it." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22 (1971) (citation
omitted).
339. See supra notes 117, 229-51.
340. See supra notes 252-71 and accompanying text.
341. See Ming, supra note 308, at 3.
342. See Singer, supra note 214, at 32.
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To summarize, whereas classic, preference-seeking bribery can legiti-
mately be subjected to strong economic and moral condemnation, the many
gradations of payments that fall short of tis category are more difficult to
classify As we shall see m the following subpart, the FCPA is ill equipped
to control preference-seeking bribery and has no business controlling the
more ambiguous gradations of payment that proliferate m the real world.
2. FCPA-Style Legislation Is Not the Best Way to Curb Bribery
and Is Officious and Insensitive to Cultural Differences
and Issues of National Sovereignty
The FCPA appears to have had little effect in eliminating or reducing
corrupt practices throughout the world.'i Although the FCPA might have
greater effect if its approach were adopted by all nations, statutory ubiquity
is unrealistic under any conditions and near impossible in regard to such
controversial legislation.'  Even if some of the present promsing efforts' 4
lead other countries to take a more aggressive position m fighting bribery,
difficulties in umversalizing the FCPA approach come from two sources:
the fact that some countries which develop antibribery campaigns will create
less aggressive, invasive programs than the FCPA,l and the fact that
global pluralism presently renders the establishment of any consistent global
policy a highly remote prospect. 7
The FCPA's ineffectiveness is exacerbated by poor drafting. Despite
congressional efforts to rectify the deficiencies of the 1977 version of the
343. Of course, the effects of legislation such as the FCPA are difficult to measure.
This is because we cannot make comparisons between global corruption levels with the
FCPA and without the FCPA. We must choose one approach and can only observe one set
of global outcomes within a given time frame. We do know that bribery remains a wide-
spread practice despite the efforts of the FCPA, but whether these levels would increase,
remain stable, or decrease in the absence of the FCPA cannot be determined conclusively
344. For a discussion of the ongoing controversy over the FCPA approach, see supra
notes 216, 303-16 and accompanying text.
345. For a discussion of the progress that is being made in the form of commitments
and agreements by regional and world organizations, such as the OAS and the OECD, see
supra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
346. How conscientiously countries committed to fighting bribery will follow through,
and whether they will go so far as to enact their own versions of the FCPA m so doing, are
obviously conjectural. Even if all countries move to execute the commitments they make
against corruption when they become signatories to compacts of regional or global organiza-
tions, historic context suggests that many will prefer less extreme approaches than the
FCPA.
347 For a discussion of the variety of global approaches to bribery, see supra notes
307-14 and accompanying text.
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FCPA,1 the 1988 Amendments remain as troublesome as their statutory
predecessor. Specifically, ambiguities in both the statutory language and
the cultural contexts m which the statute operates create an intolerable
chilling effect on lawful business practices. 9 Until and unless Congress
can draft legislation that more clearly distinguishes between acceptable and
unacceptable practices, the FCPA will remain unacceptably overreaching
and blunt.
In addition, the reach of the FCPA into the behaviors of U.S. compa-
nies m their operations abroad is unjustifiably intrusive. We cannot move
automatically from even the boldest assertion that bribery is morally and
economically unsound to a conclusion that the FCPA is good policy Even
if the FCPA were effective in curtailing bribery, positive ends would not
justify otherwise unacceptable means. Although it is true that all govern-
ments should seek to eliminate preference-seeking bribery, it does not
necessarily follow that we should take pride in the FCPA's posture and
explore all opportunities to "spread tis gospel worldwide."35 Indeed, the
missionary zeal suggested by this exhortation reflects the kind of overreach-
Ing we should studiously avoid.35'
Proponents of extraterritorial governance over U.S. individuals and
firms may suggest that the FCPA's far-reaching approach is justified by
growing antibribery sentiments across the globe. 3m This reasoning is
specious, as a sympathy of underlying values between two countries does
not vindicate imperialism. Increasing receptiveness to an American ideal
does not justify American legislation that moderates activity abroad. If
cross-cultural differences in attitudes toward bribery are indeed shrlnkng,
and other nations are moving closer toward an American-style denunciation,
they are free to develop laws and enforcement policies that restrict bribery
and that are as rigorous as those adopted by the United States within U.S.
borders.353 The more presumptuous approach of the FCPA is paternalistic,
348. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 220-71 and accompanying text.
350. Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues, 50 U. MAMI L.
REV 445, 447 (1996).
351. European Commission officials describe the zeal of U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor m his fight against international bribery as "sanctimonious." See Commis-
sion Shows Wariness at U.S. Antibribery Campaign, EUR. INFO. SERVICE, MULTINAT'L
SERVICE, Mar. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
352. Purported growth in global antibribery sentiments might be inferred from recent
multilateral antibribery initiatives and movements. For a discussion of such efforts, see
supra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
353. Along these lines, Claire Davies, Press Officer for Britain's Department of Trade
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invasive, and insulting toward other nations that should be free to monitor
business transactions within their own borders. As one business consultant
in London observes, the FCPA's intrusiveness engenders "a great deal of
resentment in Europe and other places as well about U.S. efforts to exter-
nalize U.S. law "I'
Understanding the offensiveness and mvasiveness of the FCPA requires
examination of more than legal technicalities. It demands the subtler
analysis of political and cultural realities. While the United States may
technically exonerate the FCPA under jurisdictional tenets,' 5 we are none-
theless unwise to exercise jurisdiction. We must consider questions of
comity, international relations, and respect for the autonomy of other
nations.356 Hardly renowned for adoption of a deferential posture in world
and Industry, defended Britain's decision not to adopt an FCPA approach. She described
extraterritorial bribes paid by British companies as "a matter for the country that the British
company is m at the tune to deal with." John Kimelman, The Lonely Boy Scout, FIN.
WORLD, Aug. 16, 1994, at 50.
354. Id.
355. See United States v Layton, 509 F Supp. 212, 217-18 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The
court noted:
While it remains true that legislation of Congress is generally to be construed to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States , courts
have not hesitated to invoke extra-territorial application for two types
of statutes: (1) statutes which represent an effort by the government to protect
itself against obstructions and frauds; and (2) statutes where the vulnerability of
the United States outside its own territory to the occurrence of the prohibited
conduct is sufficient, because of the nature of the offense, to infer reasonably that
Congress meant to reach those extra-territorial acts.
Id.
356. The courts have recognized that questions of comity are at the core of the contro-
versy over the appropriateness of the FCPA's reach. To date, they have generally found
that the FCPA passes legal tests associated with comity See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.
v Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 400 (1990) (addressing Act of State
doctrine considerations). The Act of State doctrine, which shields foreign governments from
U.S. judicial inquiry regarding their acts within their own territorial boundaries, has
traditionally rested upon "the highest considerations of international comity and expediency "
Id. at 404. The Supreme Court further observed that the function of the Act of State
doctrine has recently shifted toward separation of powers considerations and concluded that
the doctrine does not preclude civil actions merely because a decision may reflect or
comment upon the acts of foreign officials m their own countries. Id. at 404, 406. The
doctrine is evoked only "when a court must decide - that is, when the outcome of the case
turns upon - the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign." Id. at 406.
The Supreme Court's grant of substantial protection to the FCPA against application of
the Act of State doctrine determines only whether the FCPA passes legal muster. The
decision does not determine the social, political, and diplomatic wisdom of Congress's
evaluating and assessing the actions of foreign officials within their own borders.
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affairs, the United States should exercise great care to distinguish between
persuasion and intrusion. Unfortunately, the FCPA's approach is mvasive,
encroaching on the reasonable expectation that sovereign nations will be
accorded substantial freedom in regulating activities within their own
borders. Especially when one considers the dubious success of the FCPA
to date, as well as the possibility that more respectful efforts at influence
may be more hospitably received, it seems eminently reasonable to accord
sovereign interests in self-governance greater weight than technical U.S.
jurisdictional clauns over the activities of U.S. companies and citizens.
FCPA detractors can and should make a compelling case against the
statute based on its ineffectuality, chilling effect on legitimate business, and
officiousness. Critics should not rely on arguments that criunalization of
classic, preference-seeking bribes places U.S. businesses at a global com-
petitive disadvantage.3' Unilateral adoption of the FCPA clearly does
unpose such a disadvantage on U.S. firms."' 8 Nonetheless, compliance
costs are unpersuasive arguments against legislation that seeks to curb
extremely harmful activity
To understand why, consider this analogy Countries whose domestic
laws prohibit child labor abuses or industrial brutality and bloodshed
obviously constrain the competitive practices of local companies. As m the
case of the FCPA, persuasive arguments can be made that such laws place
countries like the United States at a competitive disadvantage by prohibiting
them from adopting the exploitative practices of foreign competitors m less
controlled environments. Still, such protective laws are clearly justifiable,
provided that they inhibit harmful behavior without undue ambiguity,
excessive chilling of lawful behavior, or intrusion into the sovereignty of
other nations. The competitive disadvantage to companies bound by the
protective laws is outweighed by the utility of the laws m preventing clearly
odious and mjurious activities.
Analogously, there is little credibility m arguments that Americans
should be permitted to pay harmful, preference-seeking bribes in order to
remain competitive m global markets. Competitive disadvantage is a poor
justification for condoning highly destructive activities. Accordingly, critics
who stand on solid ground by protesting the FCPA's ineffectiveness,
ambiguity, chilling effect on legitimate activities, and cultural intrusiveness
dilute the power of their arguments by putting forth clans of global
competitive disadvantage.
357 See supra Part IV.A.
358. As we have seen, speakers both for and against the FCPA use competitive
disadvantage as an argument to support their cases. See supra Parts r.B & IV.A.
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 229 (1997)
B. What Alternative Should We Pursue to Reduce
Global Bribery and Corruption?
For the reasons just enunciated, the United States should not continue
to support the FCPA or press other nations to emulate our current mvasive
position. Instead, we should maintain domestic antibribery laws and work
m the global marketplace to persuade other nations to adopt and vigorously
enforce laws that crnmalize bribery within their own borders. Stringent
domestic antibribery laws can be a powerful instrument in the war against
corruption. Businesses will be reluctant to violate the crunminal laws of the
nations in which they operate, provided the laws are seriously enforced and
provide sufficiently punitive fines and prison sentences.
Moreover, given hostility toward the FCPA in many parts of the
world, countries will be more receptive to adopting domestic laws than
extraterritorial laws. If growing global antibribery movements359 are to be
furthered, influential politicians and organizations must be careful to put
forth options to which foreign governments are likely to be receptive.
Successful proliferation of domestic antibribery legislation will have a
greater impact on worldwide corruption than abortive efforts to sell the
unpopular FCPA approach.
The U.S. government, as well as entities such as the OECD, OAS,
WTO, and ABA, can also provide recommendations in regard to payments
by guest firms m countries that lack meaningful antibribery legislation.
Wallace has labelled the promotion of voluntary guidelines the "mminalist
position."3" Nonbinding recommendations can provide valuable guidance
to firms, while relegating ultimate decisionmakmg authority to the strategic
and moral judgment of businesspersons operating abroad. This position
grants guests in foreign countries the discretion to make difficult choices.
Because the status of alternatives is often ambiguous under the FCPA,
adoption of voluntary guidelines eliminates the present chilling effect on
legitimate transactions.361
359. Leiken lists some of these countries, including Argentina, Cambodia, Italy, Hun-
gary, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, El Salvador, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania,
Thailand, New Zealand, and Zimbabwe. See Robert S. Leiken, An End to Corruption,
WASH. POsT, Apr. 16, 1996, at A15.
360. Cynthia D. Wallace, International Codes and Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises: Update and Selected Issues, 17 INT'L LAw. 435, 442 (1983).
361. See supra Part IV
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VT. Conclusion
Congress passed the FCPA with the best of intentions. The classic,
preference-seeking bribery that the FCPA is meant to punish is econorm-
cally and morally repugnant. Unfortunately, Congress's admirable goals
cannot salvage the FCPA. Bribery has continued to thrive during nearly
two decades of the legislation's existence,362 and prosecutions have been
rare.
363
While the FCPA appears to have had little effect in reducing global
corruption, it has yielded untoward side effects. Because of the FCPA's
vagueness and the complexity of the international contexts in which it oper-
ates, the FCPA has a chilling effect on legitimate transactions.31 More-
over, the FCPA engenders worldwide hostility for its insupportable mva-
siveness into local sovereign autonomy 31 Finally, because the nuances of
varying practices around the world must be understood in cultural context,
the FCPA's bluntness subjects Congress's efforts to justifiable charges of
ethnocentrism and moral imperialism.
Accordingly, Congress should abolish the FCPA, and the United States
should cease efforts to persuade other nations to enact their own versions
of the FCPA. Instead, we should maintain strong domestic antibribery
legislation and work to persuade other nations to do the same. In addition,
both government and international organizations should provide voluntary
guidelines that help busmesspersons abroad assess the economic and ethical
ramifications of various fees, payments, and gifts.
362. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 8.
364. See supra Part N.A.
365. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 297-312 and accompanying text.
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